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In articulations of the subaltern, the subject is assumed to lack agency, unless 
proven otherwise. This interpretation partially stems from the idea that she is subject to 
powers—of overlapping, congruent, and uneven forces of political, social, and economic 
rule. This assumption underlies scholarship from a number of disciplines and areas of 
focus in postcolonial study. Anthropologists like Saba Mahmood have upended 
conventional understandings of agency by demonstrating how subjects assert agency 
through ways that potentially appear as if they are buying into their own oppression.1 Her 
claim that submission and piety are forms of agency strikes at the very heart of the 
perennial question of whether Muslim women “need saving.”2 It still relies, however, on 
this idea that agency must be proved. The dominant assumption is that Muslim women do 
not have agency; Mahmood artfully argues and challenges this assumption. By phrasing 
the question in this way, it leads to the assumption that subaltern subjects do not have 
agency, and must fit certain criteria to prove that they do in fact. While scholars like 
Mahmoud have expanded the range of what those criteria are, it nonetheless lays on the 
subaltern to prove to the Western academy that they in fact have agency.  
Spivak complicates the question of the burden of proof by questioning if the 
subaltern can “speak,” ultimately concluding that an essential subaltern voice and the 
reinterpretation of anti-hegemonic actions prevents the subaltern from having a “voice.”3 
In Spivak’s vision, subaltern subjects cannot prove that they have agency because every 
potentially agential action is recorded within Western frameworks of knowledge-
                                                
1 Saba Mahmood, "Politics of piety," The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2005). 
2 Lila Abu Lughod, "Do Muslim women really need saving? Anthropological reflections on cultural 
relativism and its others," American anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 783-790. 
3 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?," Can the subaltern speak? Reflections on the 
history of an idea (1988): 21-78. 
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production that prohibit the subaltern from controlling the narrative construction of their 
own choices and actions. If the subaltern is not ascribed agency, but also does not have 
the power to claim it, then subaltern subjects are stuck as victims to forces they cannot 
control, to oppressions that shape it.  This view is not only depressing, but mandates that 
Western academics see the subaltern as an object that may or may not be granted the 
status of agent. Determinations of agency, especially in the West, should be interrogated. 
Why is the focus on the subaltern subject’s fundamental lack? Why is the critical lens 
turned toward labeling groups of individuals (agents/non-agents) rather than looking 
upon the institutional powers that prevent people from expressing or fully expressing the 
agency that they do have?  
Like Mahmood, I will seek to expand the criteria of what is considered agency. 
My arguments about the possession of agency will focus on demonstrating the inherent 
agency of the subaltern subject. In other words, I will argue that the subaltern subject has 
agency until proven otherwise. To do so, I will focus specifically on conversion to Islam 
in México. As Mahmood herself showed, religious adherence is often discredited as the 
ultimate submission instead of a form of agency. Religious conversion is often viewed 
through the same lens that Mahmood critiques: as a force that acts upon subaltern 
subjects, something that happens to them without their input or desire.  
My point is not to prove that converts to Islam in México necessarily have 
agency. Rather, I will engage in a critique of the ways that discussions of agency occur 
within and outside of academia. To try and prove that a community, or even an individual 
is an agent is related to but aside from the crux of what I’m arguing: that the way 
discourses around otherized subjects assume passivity is flawed. Putting the subaltern to 
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trial with the assumption of passivity, and the opportunity to prove agency demonstrates 
not the subaltern’s natural tendencies towards passivity but our own biases towards who 
the subaltern is and what actions they can and are allowed to take. Arguing that the 
community of converts has agency only perpetuates this standard of assumptions. In 
many ways, my goal is similar to the one that Fanon expresses in Black Skin, White 
Masks. He says, “it would be quite easy to prove, or win the admission, that the black is 
the equal of the white. But my purpose is quite different: What I want to do is help the 
black man to free himself of the arsenal of complexes that has been developed by the 
colonial environment.”4 Likewise, I could prove that some subaltern subjects have 
agency, but my point is to intervene in the perpetuation of colonial thinking. 
Converts in México are often treated with some degree of strangeness by those 
who study them, as something that is worthy of observation because it seems out of place 
or bizarre. This is especially true of converts in the southern state of Chiapas, who are 
overwhelmingly indigenous Maya. The overlap of religious, ethnic, legal, economic, 
gendered, and national concerns allows examination of the way agency is constructed 
amongst these routes. This inquiry is epistemological, digging at the ways in which 
people think and talk about subaltern subjects. In many ways, this piece will mirror the 
approach of Srinivas Aravamudan in his book Tropicopolitans.5 Aravamudan searches 
for agency in colonial-era literature (claiming that resistance is not simply a method of 
the post-colonial era). This inquiry is based on the assumption that colonized subjects had 
agency that was expressed in their literary works. I will work to show why this should be 
                                                
4 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks  trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 
30.  
5 Srinivas Aravamudan, Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688-1804 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999). 
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applied more broadly. Rather than showing agency as an expression of choice or 
resistance, I will strive to show how agency is inherent, even in acts of submission.  
I will begin by exploring both religious conversion and colonialism to 
demonstrate both the need for a new approach toward the treatment of the subaltern. I 
will then explain how and why approaches toward agency should be the norm by 
exploring the ways this affects converts to Islam in México. In the first chapter, I will 
discuss the way in which conversion is related to discussions of authenticity and 
judgements of the authentic, and especially how that relates to Mexicans who have 
converted to some strain of Sufism. In the second chapter, I will look at the ways in 
which converts form new communities, and other acts of creation. In the third chapter, I 
will analyze desire, looking specifically as arguments about conversion and 
cosmopolitanism. To conclude, I will look to the future and new questions that arise from 
this research.  
 
Religious Conversion  
Religion, and especially religious conversion, has long been a sticky subject for 
postcolonialists. Conversion has always been a difficult issue to clearly delineate because 
of the many forms that religions themselves take. The boundaries of what is considered 
religion often predetermine what is considered true conversion. Take for instance the 
debate over whether or not ideologies like Marxism are religions.6 While certain rituals 
could perhaps be associated with Marxism, it would primarily be an intellectual 
conversion. Where then, does that place systems like Shintoism, practices that many 
                                                
6  For examples of this discussion see Kurtz 1988 or Riegel 2007. 
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Japanese people claim are not rituals associated with a religion? What is defined as a 
religion changes what is defined as conversion.  
 It is not within the scope of this project for me to claim or argue what is or is not a 
religion. I will interrogate how religious conversion is talked about, especially concerning 
the treatment of conversion narratives created by those in power. Western scholarship on 
conversion has origins in a psychology, as scholars sought to understand what internal 
factors led to conversion. These theories were predicated on the assumption that religion 
is determined by internally held beliefs. Scholarship like that conducted by William 
James and Arthur Nock in the early 20th century dominated academia, promoting the 
conclusion that religion operates as it does in the Western Christian context. Both men 
relied on the idea of another psychologist, Edwin Starbuck, that conversion was a 
“process of struggling away from sin.”7 Conversion as described by this school of 
thought is determined by an individual who makes a conscious choice to escape negative 
consequences. People who convert for materially or societally beneficial reasons are not 
deigned “true” converts because the impetus of conversion must be internally held 
beliefs, with ritual actions a mere reflection of those internal beliefs.  
New religious movements that arose in the middle of the 20th century prompted 
sociologists to observe the effects of conversion. This research challenged the views of 
conversion posited by scholars in the tradition of William James. John Lofland and 
Rodney Stark spearheaded the efforts to offer a new framework for conversion. In 
“Conversion Motifs,” they outline six themes that classify conversion literature based on 
certain dimensions (e.g. degree of social pressure, intellectual inclinations) that were 
                                                
7 Edwin Diller Starbuck, The psychology of religion: An empirical study of the growth of religious 
consciousness. Vol. 38. Walter Scott, 1899. 
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present in accounts of conversion.8 The six motifs that Lofland and Skonovd identify--
intellectual, mystical, experimental, affectional, revivalist, and coercive--seek to offer a 
broader scope of what constitutes religious conversion. This offers a more inclusive view 
of religion; the differing degrees of social pressure and individual choice allow for 
religious traditions that are more community oriented. Most evidently, Lofland and Stark 
strip individual agency from the conversion process by preventing a notion of conversion 
that happens out of a communal setting and thus, ignoring the theological appeal of a 
religion. Even the two motifs that Lofland and Stark identify as having a low degree of 
social pressure--intellectual and mystical--require a community in order to sustain the 
change in belief. This model also denies the theological appeal of a religion to (potential) 
converts, placing almost all of the impetus of conversion upon the social relationships 
that converts have with a religious community.  
Robin Horton, a social anthropologist, sought to expand the notion of society 
within this model by analyzing external forces, attributing conversion to cultural and 
historical shifts. He specifically notes economic downturns or encounters with other 
societies that put stress on a specific culture.9 If the Williams/Nock model is personal and 
the Lofland/Stark model is intra-personal, Horton’s model is external, stripping the 
individual from any potential action. To Horton, the religion itself is irrelevant; as long as 
the religion is “global,” the external forces and stresses prompt conversion over the allure 
of specific beliefs. These “universal” religions are constructed monoliths that are 
unaffected by the encounters they have with new belief systems. This lack of discourse 
                                                
8 John Lofland and Norman Skonovd, "Conversion motifs," Journal for the scientific study of religion 
(1981): 373-385. 
9 Robin Horton, “A Definition of Religion, and its Uses,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 90 
(1960): 201-226.  
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between hegemonic and the dominated beliefs strips agency from people, especially those 
dominated by colonial empires that ascribe to universal religions.  
 Max Heirich and Eugene Gallagher, among others, have sought to reevaluate 
these standpoints. Gallagher, in Expectation and Experience, criticizes the individualists 
for prescribing what conversion ought to look like and the sociologists and 
anthropologists for denying agency to converts. He seeks to identify a middle ground that 
allows for external pressures and internal beliefs. The definition of conversion that Max 
Heirich proposes summarizes this line of thinking:  
If experiences or encounters take place that can not be encompassed within current 
explanatory schemes yet cannot be ignored, present understandings of root reality 
may come into question. Alternatively, when quite unacceptable outcomes appear 
imminent and inevitable, if current understandings of root reality are correct, many 
persons begin to reexamine their most basic assumptions.10  
 
While one could argue that this widens the scope to include belief systems that are 
not typically considered religions--say, human rights or Marxism--this widening perhaps 
illuminates the relationship between conversion and modernity. Heirich’s definition 
allows what are traditionally considered religions to be analyzed alongside those that are 
not. After all, are there not certain rituals related to human rights? Certain faith values 
withheld (“democracy”)? Certain words recited at certain moments (“equality” “self-
determination”)? Certain powers invoked for protection? A proselytization of those who 
are “unbelievers”?  A theoretical basis of the human as sacred? Rather than relying on 
theo-centric definitions, Heirich designates religion as a fundamental belief about the way 
the world operates. This helps distinguish between groups about what is a proper form of 
religion, de-essentializing religious communities that are often construed as a single 
                                                
10 Max Heirich, “Change of Heart: A Test of Some Widely Held Theories About Religious Conversion,” 
American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 3 (1977): 674-5.  
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monolith that has certain, set beliefs. Any number of worldviews can be present in what is 
considered one religion--perhaps as many as there are adherents. However, general 
streams of thoughts and trends can still be analyzed on a macro level. In other words, an 
analyst may begin a framework of study by examining certain worldviews, diminishing 
the need for academics to add commentary to the discourse about what truly constitutes 
the religion that they are studying. Conversion in this light can be studied without denying 
the converts’ own feelings and experiences while also applying social and structural 
analysis to the conversion.  
This definition also helps prevent the temporal relocation of religion as pre-
modern. Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, posited that nationalism inherited 
the role that religion did as a cultural unifier. It is interesting to note that Anderson himself 
delineates the development of nationalism in his own theories of “empty time.”11 
Consciously or not, Anderson situates religious community as before the age of 
nationalism. (Anderson is far from the most egregious offender. Secularists often placed 
themselves as more advanced and modern than their religious counterparts, as epitomized 
by the “new atheist” movement. One could argue that Anderson situates the imagined, 
unified religious communities as pre-modern, and not religious communities themselves.) 
The definition Heirich poses instead constructs all of us as religious--after all, we each 
hold views about the world. While those beliefs don’t necessarily include a spiritual 
element, the comparison discourages temporal relocation because it insists that everyone 
operates within this same temporal sphere.  
In some ways, Anderson complicates the idea of both nationalism and religious 
                                                
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Verso 
Books, 2006. 
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affiliation. Anderson is careful to note that nationalism did not replace religion 
signification--rather, he understood religion as one part of an imagined nationality. 
Religion is entangled with the imaging of self and nation. Anderson helps explain the 
fallacy of assigning certain nationalities to certain religions, or acting as if converts are no 
longer part of ethnic or national communities.  Certain people and groups claim that India 
is Hindu, that Japan is Shinto, or that México is Catholic. Majority religious groups shape 
the national narrative in many ways. Anderson’s theories explain why and how religious 
and national identities are entwined in people’s imaginations to the point of 
essentialization: where one cannot be Indian without being Hindu, cannot be Japanese 
without being Shinto, or Mexican without being Catholic.  
 
The Question of Colonialism 
Defining precisely what colonialism encompasses is a controversial and perhaps 
impossible task. Scholars and dictionaries speak of “domination,” “dependent areas,” 
“control,” “exploitation,” “settlers,” “territory,” “political power,” but come to little 
consensus on whether colonialism is the ideology or the practice, whether it refers to the 
domination of land or people, whether direct political interference (as opposed to say, 
economic interference, although it is hard to imagine one without the other), or whether it 
means the same thing as imperialism. Was France colonized by Nazi Germany during 
World War II? Is Basque country currently colonized by Spain? Could different iterations 
of Chinese dynasties be considered colonial? Was Czechoslovakia colonized by the 
USSR? Was the Aztec Empire a colonial power? Or the Inca? How dominant must the 
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dominant power be in order to be considered colonizing? Is economic domination 
enough, or must it be political, or cultural?  
 Postcolonial theory falls almost laughably short of providing a satisfactory 
answer. The temporal and spatial boundaries of postcolonial theory links colonialism 
with modernity (and postcolonialism with postmodernity) in which a certain 
Enlightenment understanding of the nation gave rise to competitive colonialisms, 
culminating in an end of colonialism following the liberatory struggles of the 1940s-
1970s. It further restricts postcolonialism spatially through an Orientalist lens, in which 
the exotified Other that was famously described by Edward Said remains firmly rooted in 
Easterness. This naturally excludes a large potential range of colonial subjects.  
Many scholars criticize postcolonial theory by linking it with other posts and 
debunking the idea that there has been some shift from current temporality to a future 
“post” temporality. In particularly when it comes to postcolonialism, but also visible in 
other posts (like poststructuralism, postmodernism), there is no clear divide between what 
is postcolonialism and what is colonialism. Colonialism in this way is restricted to purely 
political power, postcolonial theory referring directly to methods of thinking that stem 
from societies that have gained independence. Many scholars have criticized the term 
postcolonial for the implications that there is a clear divide between the colonial and 
afterwards, and that modernity exists in the afterwards, despite the fact that many 
(perhaps, arguably, all) colonized communities are still facing problems based on the 
imposed historical structures of colonialism. This endurance is not represented in the 
term postcolonial, nor does the term represent the complicated histories of colonized 
spaces. 
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Cultural theorist Stuart Hall denounces blanket criticism of postcolonial theory 
based on discursive realities (usage of the prefix “post”). Postcolonialism, as described by 
Hall, is marked by the transnational reimagination of subjectivities. In this theoretical 
mindscape, the postcolonial subject is one that occupies a space at the limits.  Capitalism, 
globalized media, and the weakening of boundaries are cited as the forces that mark the 
post- of postcolonialism as more than simple political liberation from direct dominance. 
The dissolution of the boundaries that previously demarcated identity formation, to Hall, 
is a constant and uneven movement that makes the present a different time than the 
preceding colonialisms. To Hall, the borders of culture, politics, economics, etc. are 
constantly erased and redrawn into formulations that negotiate new shapes and 
identities.12 
Disagreement between these two camps--both of whom hold clearly anti-
colonialism dear to their academic scholarship--seems to stem from a lack of consensus 
on whether or not the present (however defined) is different in some fundamental ways. 
That perhaps, with advent of ways in which the world is integrated politically, 
economically, and culturally, that the rise of Appiah’s cosmopolitanism has drastically 
changed how people relate to each other and to their own identities. From a number of 
academic perspectives, labeling this time as different makes sense: epidemiologists, 
computer scientists, and social historians, for example, could perhaps utilize this idea of a 
world completely changed by new media and technologies.  
However, from a standpoint of looking at colonialism, calling the present era a 
postcolonial one is problematic in that presumes that the forces that Hall speaks about, 
                                                
12 Stuart Hall, “When was ‘the postcolonial’? Thinking at the limit,” in The Postcolonial Question: 
Common Skies, Divided Horizons, eds. Iain Chamberlain and Lidia Curti (London: Routledge, 1996).  
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the borders and limits that he notes are being redrawn are influenced by and stem from 
lines and borders that preceded them. As Hall says, scholars who pick at “post” merely 
for sake of being pedantic, have missed the general point about how the world is 
changing. And yet, criticism of a “post” raises necessary discongruities in the invention 
of a new order dictated by different rules that become especially problematic for scholars 
of Latin America. Postcolonial theory has not fit well in certain contexts because of its 
exclusionary temporal and geographical connotations. It is difficult (although not 
impossible) for scholars to place Latin America within this postcolonial framework 
because of its spatial relationship and its distinctive temporal political development. Latin 
America is geographically situated within the west--further west than most of what is 
considered the West. Orientalization, in this sense, seems as both a misnomer and a poor 
label for the processes of Otherization that Latin American people endure. Colonization 
began earlier compared to many cultures and societies and formal political independence 
came a century before revolutions that are prototypically postcolonial (see India, 
Algeria). Can we really claim that Latin America has been a “postcolonial” society since 
the early 19th century, right at the apex of conquering and colonization in other parts of 
the globe? It seems farcical to lump Latin America in 1850 with the modes of thinking 
that dominated the revolutionary experiences in many parts of the world more than a 
century later. Considering the influence that other dominators (not necessarily the direct 
colonizers) imposed upon Latin America, in what way are Spain’s economic 
exploitations different from the economic exploitations faced at the hands of the United 
States? 
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Aníbal Quíjano, a leading subaltern scholar of Latin America, coined the term 
“coloniality” to bridge the gap between the experience of colonialism and postcolonial 
theory.13 Specifically defining the coloniality of power, Quíjano seeks to deconstruct the 
persistent dualisms that haunt postcolonialism. If postcolonialism exists as a discourse of 
subjects at the limits, then coloniality seeks to place the subject as an object of 
heterogeneity and hybridity that fundamentally crosses borders. The coloniality of power 
seeks to tear down the constructed divide between the colonial and the postcolonial, 
arguing that the structures and hegemonies that were constructed and reinforced in 
colonialism continue. Quíjano claims that there is not a different capitalism, or a different 
racism, and arguing that there are disconnects these structures and realities from their 
deep roots in colonial histories. Not only are these symptoms all connected to 
colonialism, but to each other. He speaks at length at how capitalism cannot be 
disentangled from racism, demonstrating how labor is monetized differently based on 
who is performing it. He explains too how this is connected to the appropriation of and 
derision at the ways of the colonized. Quíjano claims that “[Europeans] repressed as 
much as possible the colonized forms of knowledge production, the models of the 
production of meaning, their symbolic universe, the model of expression and of 
objectification and subjectivity”.14 His emphasis on the forms of the relationship between 
knowledge-production and power reframes the question of colonialism in contemporary 
scholarship. 
                                                
13 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social Classification,” in Coloniality at Large 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). 
 
14 Ibid., 541. 
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In tandem with Quíjano, Walter Mignolo further develops Quíjano’s ideas on the 
coloniality of power to challenge the very epistemic basis of the current world order. 
Postcolonial theory, to Mignolo, is disconnected from the biopolitics of the subaltern, 
remaining nothing more than a thought experiment of the academy to talk about 
improving the lives of the oppressed by creating knowledge about them. The coloniality 
of power is extended through the very modes of epistemic knowledge production that 
works in a cycle of words, beliefs, and actions that self-reinforce. Mignolo challenges the 
basis of what is considered rational, arguing for the adoption of alternate cosmologies 
that reclaim what is known from the oppressors for the sake of the subaltern. He defines 
coloniality as a four-pronged method of control: over economy, authority, gender and 
sexuality, and over knowledge and subjectivity.15 He then goes on to argue that 
“coloniality is constitutive of modernity and not derivative” of it.16  
Although neither Quíjano nor Mignolo directly claim that the centrality of the 
subject, coloniality focuses on how, through different strains of oppression and 
domination, through different times of history, different ideological motivations, the 
forced reimagination of self runs at the heart of coloniality. Santiago Castro-Gómez, 
depending on the work of the former scholars, says that the goal of coloniality is 
“eradicating any belief system” that does not fit into the “worldviews” of the colonizers.17 
While one could argue that this simply points to a conflict in contesting ideologies, 
“worldview” implies the subject’s relationship to the very world around her. If, as 
                                                
15 Walter Mignolo, preamble in Latin American Literature and Culture, ed. Sara Castro-Klaren (Marden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008): 15.  
16 Ibid., 22. 
17 Santiago Castro-Gómez, “(Post)Coloniality for Dummies: Latin American Perspectives on Modernity, 
Coloniality, and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” in Coloniality at Large (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008). 
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Mignolo claims, the rationale at the roots of the global system is based on specific 
cultural logic, then it would stand to reason that this global system promotes a specific 
subjectivity that is also constructed to support the coloniality of power. 
For this reason, coloniality as a framework is preferable due to its placement of the 
individual and the community as the center of moral and analytical concern. Through the 
structuring and restructuring of identities, we can see the continual and shifting forces of 
oppression through time and space than if we traced merely the political, cultural, 
economic, social, or religious transitions of a nation or community. The structures of self 
can be changed without a shift in any of the macro-structures listed above, or can stay 
constant even in external flux. Other frameworks, including those lent from postcolonial 
theory, tend to rely on the production of knowledge that either neglects the subaltern 
subject or relegates her to not quite living up to Western norms.  
Take for instance, the idea of the irrational. Edward Said claimed that through the 
Otherization of people, communities were able to define themselves.18 He applied this 
example most prominently to the Western world and the civilizations that have abutted it, 
of which the character was primarily Islamic. In this way, the Andersonian idea of 
“imagined communities” is defined not simply by the characteristics of the group itself, 
but by the qualities of what the group is not. His negation is critical to understanding that 
qualities that are attributed to the Other that are taken as factual are all viewed from the 
lens of the community doing the otherizing. Thus, claims of rationality/irrationality are 
rooted in specific cultural logics. Postcolonial theory has sought to demonstrate the 
rationality of what is considered irrational. And yet, those arguments reify the root logics 
                                                
18 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 
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that determine what is rational and irrational. The very qualifications and methods of 
analysis are rooted in culturally-specific values. If rational simply means based on 
thoughts and calculations, then it is hard to think of a situation in which an action is 
irrational. Even if a person or society is unaware of the origins behind ritual actions does 
not mean that they do not have strong rational associations. If a person’s fundamental 
understanding about how the world operates depends on a certain conception of the self as 
both an agent and a subject of forces that are disjunctive and uneven, then it is impossible 
to think of a situation in which something could be irrational.  
In Melanesia, colonialism uprooted many of the roots and routes with which the 
people living there operated previous to colonial incursions. One phenomenon that 
emerged during the colonial encounters have been labeled “cargo cults.” Indigenous 
people would perform elaborate rituals that mirrored the military actions of the 
colonizers--marching around with sticks, or constructing graves with crosses upon them, 
or constructing copies of airports, radios, and other technologies that they had never 
encountered before with materials that they had on hand (coconuts, leaves, wood, to 
name a few.) These rituals were supposed to be for the procurement of goods. Seeing that 
the colonizers performed certain rituals and had access to objects, cargo cult members 
replicated those same rituals in order to gain access to objects. Scholarship about cargo 
cults focuses upon the materialism that is inherent in such religious practices, in which 
rituals are staged and performed for access to what has been labeled cargo. Cargo cults 
are represented as the antithesis of the rational. The idea that such performances could 
bring physical results is mocked.19  
                                                
19 Andrew Lattas, "Hysteria, Anthropological Disclosure and the Concept of the Unconscious: Cargo Cults 
and the Scientisation of Race and Colonial Power," Oceania 63, no. 1 (1992): 1-14. 
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 Cargo cults represent the height of the rational/irrational duality in Otherization, 
in which the acts of Others are perceived and studied as inherently senseless or without 
basis in thought when in reality, the modes and basis of the sense and thoughts differ. 
Some scholars might say that attributing cargo cults to the ephemera of materialism 
actually reveals Western materialism. Why focus on the procurement of goods over all 
other spiritual and ritual practices? One could argue that the spiritual aspects (ancestors 
or spirits are attributed with granting the accesses to the goods) are much more central to 
the belief system. Or alternatively, the colonizers in many ways do have access to the 
commodities because their ancestors granted them access--through material invention, 
transmission, and learning that culminated in the ability to transport goods. To act as if 
the Melanesians belief that their spirits and ancestors could and would grant them the 
same rights is irrational denies the complex histories of people and products.  
 I would argue that cargo cults are a way to reclaim one’s self in relation to new 
networks of oppression and difference. By re-enacting rituals that are associated with the 
colonizers, the members are expressing their deservedness and temporality in a way that 
reaffirms and places their values and practices as fully modern and productive while 
placing and defining the colonizer within their value system rather than submitting to the 
value system of the colonizer. In this way, the colonizers are participating in a system of 
values (rituals in order to procure goods) that belongs and is narrated by the colonized.  
Conversion was often used as a tool of colonial power, a violent form of stripping 
away of the culture of the colonized. To fight back against the forms of colonial 
knowledge production, some academics have used “agency” to reclaim and justify their 
cultural/religious norms. Colonized peoples are often accused of assigning agency to 
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objects that do not “truly” have agency--be it the “wrong” god or plants or other humans. 
These objects were derogatorily named fetishes by colonizers in order to degrade the 
worth of these worshipped objects.20  
Other groups of subalternists have explored how colonized people expressed 
agency even though the historical conversion project. Often indigenous people are 
constructed as passive receivers of conquering colonizers--literature is full of analogies of 
the colonized culture as the sexual receptacle of their dominators, especially when it came 
to religion. Scholars are demonstrating how colonized people changed and co-opted 
religious structures that were enforced upon them and transformed them into their own 
systems of belief. This form of disruption shows colonized people as agents in these 
circumstances, people who have taken new ideas and placed them into their worldview, 
instead of letting their worldview bend to that of the colonizer.  
Gauri Viswanathan, a leading thinker about postcolonial conversion, especially 
conversion in India, has argued that conversion more recently, outside of the times of 
direct colonialism, also serves as a form of agency for colonized subjects. In Outside the 
Fold, she notes that conversion and increased religiosity subvert and challenge British 
secularism and “tolerance.”21  This is part of her larger argument that within modernity, 
conversion disrupts the constructions of selves and communities. Viswanathan argues that 
conversion--whether assimilative or oppositional to the broader community--allows 
converts to express both “assent and dissent” of community norms. It is in this blurring, 
allowing a convert to be at one part of but also challenging their role in society, that 
                                                
20 Webb Keane, "From Fetishism to Sincerity: On Agency, the Speaking Subject, and Their Historicity in 
the Context of Religious Conversion," Comparative Studies in Society and History 39, no. 4 (1997): 674-
93. 
21 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the fold: Conversion, modernity, and belief, Princeton University Press, 
1998. 
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Viswanathan demonstrates the agency of converts. This necessarily challenges narratives 
that propose that assimilative conversion is assent and that oppositional conversion is 
dissent that often is displayed in re-tellings of conversions.22  Her argument also refuses to 
decouple religious identity from a variety of other social identities, including race and 
gender. Depending on Talal Asad’s reasoning that the modern secular only allows for 
freedom of internal consciousness, Viswanathan shows a weakness in postcolonial 
readings because of the assumption that although colonized subjects were dominated 
based on race, gender, class and other identities, there is a general sense that religious 
identities were not impinged upon because the internal consciousness of the subjects were 
not violated. In other words, colonized subjects were not forced to change internal beliefs, 
only external ones, revealing a Euro-centric (or perhaps more aptly, Euro-Christian-
centric) sensibility about the way religion operates and relates to the self.  
In conversation with both Viswanathan and Asad, Laura Dudley Jenkins promotes 
the idea that in response to this assertion of agency that does disrupt the community as it 
has imagined itself, power will seek to control the narrative of religious conversion by 
questioning the authenticity and the sincerity of the converts. If conversion stems only for 
political, social, or material benefit, then it is less disruptive. Rather than challenging the 
very norms and identifications of the community, the conversion is reconstructed to 
support the powers that be. The concern with the genuineness of conversion of mass 
movements in India that Jenkins explores is a response to the disorder caused by 
conversion. After all, if lower caste converts are changing religion for bicycles and bread, 
then they are not converting to challenge the system of castes themselves; conversely, if 
                                                
22 Colonial conversion to Christianity in a variety of circumstances were assimilative, for example, and 
black conversion to Islam in the US would be oppositional. 
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lower caste converts are converting for purely uncoerced, spiritual reasons, then Christian 
missionaries are not participating in what Jenkins characterizes as “an auction of souls.”23 
Jenkins questions why the mundane/political and the sacred/religious motivations cannot 
coexist.  
Asad, one of the most well-known thinkers in contemporary religious studies, 
comments on this supposed dichotomy between the mundane and the sacred to interrogate 
why people are so concerned with the reasons behind religious conversion.24 People do 
not question the reasoning behind forms of conversion that are not typically labeled as 
religious. Asad points to modernity as an example: when individuals and groups adopt the 
tenets of ideological modernity and all of its related rituals, fetishes, and regulations, there 
is no question as to why they did so. One could argue that shifts into modernity are 
constructed as natural processions based on ideas about the progress of society. Asad 
contends that the obsession with religion and choice is rooted in secular ideologies of self 
and the role that religion is supposed to play within an individual. Asad argues that all 
conversions are rooted in very specific historical circumstances and in a mixture of both 
individual choice and forces beyond one’s control.  
 
In México 
 Of the 130 million people who live in México today, it is difficult to ascertain the 
number of converts to Islam. Estimates range in the couple of thousand to the mid-
hundred thousands. Most scholars believe that estimates of around 2-3,000 is much too 
                                                
23 Laura Dudley Jenkins, "True Believers? Agency And Sincerity In Representations Of" Mass Movement" 
Converts In 1930s India," in Converting Cultures, eds. Dennis Washburn and A. Kevin Reinhart, pp. 435-
464. (Brill, 2007):462.  
24 Talal Asad, “Comments on Conversion,” in Conversion to Modernities, ed. Peter van der Veer, (New 
York: Routledge, 1996): 263-274.  
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low because Muslims tend to be concentrated in a few areas and because people would 
not necessarily admit their new faith. However, we can be certain that Muslims make up 
far less than 1% of the population of México, and converts even less than that.25  
 There are three main centers of conversion around which I will center my paper: 
around la frontera with the United States, in the southern state of Chiapas, and in México 
City There are certainly da’wa efforts elsewhere in the country (evidenced by Facebook 
videos of new converts taking the shahadah) but at a lower concentration compared to 
the locations I identified above. On the borderlands, conversion has stemmed primarily 
from the efforts of people who were converted in the United States and were deported or 
joined family who were deported joining with Muslim immigrants to convert other 
residents of the Northern México. In Chiapas, conversion has stemmed from the outreach 
efforts of a Sufi lineage that went in an attempt to affiliate the Ejército Zapatista 
Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation or EZLN) with Islam, and 
an offshoot of this group. In México City, there are several distinct groups that are 
sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperate in their efforts to spread the messages 
of God.  
 Each of these conversion communities faces a number of different and sometimes 
overlapping relationships with coloniality. We can see some of the effects of capitalism 
in the poverty of the laborers in Chiapas. We can see political disenfranchisement in the 
barrios in the United States where undocumented immigrants are converted alongside 
their black neighbors. We can see gender oppression in the disparagement of the female-
led Sufi tariqa in México City These are all connected to different forms of oppression 
                                                
25 Mark Lindley-Highfield of Ballumbie Castle, “Islam in Mexico and Central America,” in The Routledge 
Handbook to Islam in the West, ed. Roberto Tottoli (New York: Routledge, 2015), 154–69. 
 
 
 
 23 
that México faces at the hands of the United States, an institutionalized hatred that has 
endured with a particular vengeance.26  
  Mignolo explains “that the very concept of coloniality of power is already a 
decolonial move that, subsequently opens up the gates for imagining possible futures 
rather than just resting on the celebratory moment of critical explanation of what the 
social world is really like.”27 This particular project does not seek to “give them a voice” 
or to give the converts exposure in academia. Rather, I will seek to “[open] up the gates 
for imagining possible future” in which the ways we talk about the subalternized 
fundamentally shifts.  
 
 
  
                                                
26 That is not to say that the United States is the singular cause of all of México’s problems. However, none 
of these problems can be completely isolated from interventions and discourses that stem from the US.  
27 Mignolo, preamble to Latin American Literature and Culture, 22. 
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Authenticity 
 
 Colonialism took away the right for communities to define themselves, as Quíjano 
discusses in relation to indigenous and black identities. In this chapter, I will seek to 
demonstrate the need for frameworks that assume agency by focusing on Sufi converts to 
Islam in México. Debate over whether Sufis were properly Muslim has raged since the 
genes of Islamic mysticism, and certainly isn’t a new phenomenon nor exclusive to 
México. A number of prominent Sufis have in some way come in conflict with authority, 
or with non-Sufi Muslims, over different practices or beliefs. These points of contention 
have been exacerbated by perceptions of antinomian Sufis, that Sufism is about finding 
God through hallucinogenic mushrooms or alcohol, or about Westerners finding 
themselves through a sanitized version of Rumi. This perception endures despite a 
significant number of nomian Sufis who contributed and continue to contribute to Islamic 
philosophy and other scholarship.  
 Some Sufis have run amok with law or authority because of their popularity and 
the threat that posed to power. Hallaj, for example, ended up on the wrong side of 
political intrigue when he was ultimately condemned to death by the Abbasid court. 
Recently, the rise of Wahhabism and Salafism has put Sufis under fire for practicing 
“innovations” to what they consider the faith as practiced by Muhammad. What does this 
mean for the definition of a community? On one hand, Sufis claim to be Muslims; on the 
other hand, Wahhabists do not include Sufis within the community of Muslims. With 
whom does the authority lie to make such decisions?  
 Part of this is solved by using plural terminology when referring to larger 
communities. Here we have Islams, a way to represent that while all communities assent 
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to being Muslim, their practices and beliefs can vary widely, to the exclusion of others. 
While this certainly helps, we shouldn’t pretend that adding the letter “s” somehow 
solves the issue of bias in community self-definition. The exclusion and inclusion of 
certain communities in a definition is not a value neutral definition. In some way, we 
must judge the authenticity of the claims that are made, and evaluate whether they are 
true. In the following chapter, I will argue that the ultimate mark of authenticity is the 
subjects’ own words and actions. The subaltern should not be forced to prove that its own 
cosmovision is authentic. To prove this point, I will discuss two groups of Sufi converts, 
one in Chiapas and one in México City This is partially done because Sufism has always 
had a troubling relationship with judgements of authenticity. Even amongst Sufis 
themselves, whether someone was at a high enough station to make certain proclamations 
has depended on judgements of whether they were authentically at the station at which 
they claimed to be.   
 
Sufis of Chiapas 
 
Born into a well-off family in Scotland in 1930 as Ian Dallas, Abdalqadir as-Sufi 
emerged on the scene of London popular culture as a screenwriter--especially for his 
adaptations of classic works of literature, like Jane Eyre and The Secret Agent.28  
Increasingly disillusioned with the culture of London in the 1960s, as-Sufi traveled to 
Morocco to further engage with Islam.29 His “reversion” to Islam was overseen by 
                                                
28 Barney Henderson, “Radical Muslim leader has past in swinging London,” The Telegraph, Feb. 20, 
2010. 
29 Rumor has it that as-Sufi introduced the story of Layla and Majnun to Eric Clapton, which inspired 
Clapton’s hit song “Layla.”  
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Shaykh Abdalkarim Daudi, the Imam of the Qarawiyyin Mosque in Fes.30 As-Sufi 
changed his name to Abdalqadir, or “servant of the capable one.” To continue his 
education, as-Sufi studied under Shaykh Muhammad ibn al-Habib, a Sufi of the Darqawi-
Shadhili-Qadiri tariqa--a lineage entwined deeply with both Morocco and the Maliki 
fiqh.31 This tariqa has a long history of political activism in Morocco. In the face of first 
anti-Ottoman Wahabi-leaning rulers and then the French, the tariqa fought against power 
to ensure the continued survival of their worldview as the “incarne parfaitment le 
bicéphalisme politico-spirituel.”32  
 During his years in Morocco studying with al-Habib, as-Sufi continued to work in 
the film industry--a connection that led him to convert others. One day in Tangiers, he 
met an artist from Berkeley who told as-Sufi that he had many friends that were 
interested in mystical themes (although they tended to focus on Buddhism); when as-Sufi 
was in Los Angeles for his next project, he contacted some of the artist’s friends.33 
Notably among them was Daniel Moore, a poet who compared listening to as-Sufi 
describing Muslim history as beyond psychedelic experiences. At the end of three days, 
Moore reports that as-Sufi asked him if he wanted to accept Islam; at Moore’s hesitation, 
as-Sufi responded, “That’s not good enough. You have to decide now, yes or no. It it’s a 
yes, then we start on a great adventure. If it’s no, then blame no one, I’ve done my duty, 
I’ll just say goodbye and go on my way. But you have to decide now. I’ll go downstairs 
                                                
30 I could not find many references to Shaykh Abdalkarim Daudi outside of his role in as-Sufi’s reversion. 
There is a forum post that appears to contain information about his life besides his encounter with as-Sufi 
(while also confirming that they encounter did occur). However, since it is a forum and much of the 
information cannot be found in reputable sources at this time, I will concentrate as-Sufi’s learnings from his 
teacher al-Habib. The forum can be found at http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=258963.   
31 Patrick Bowen, A History of Conversion to Islam in the United States Vol. 1, Leiden: Brill, 2015. 
32 M. Peyron, “Derkaoua, Derqaoua, Darwawa,” Encyclopédie berbère, Vol. 15, Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 
1995: pg. 2279-2283.  
33 Bowen, 357.  
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and read a magazine and wait. Take your time.”34 Moore ended up choosing Islam, a 
legacy of one of as-Sufi’s early conversions. This emphasis on da’wa has endured in as-
Sufi’s methods and teachings. He incorporated these views and created the Murabitun 
World Movement, which through da’wa, has become a global organization. 
 In his discourses, he tells his followers to proselytize certain groups--Shi’a (whom 
he does not consider true Muslims), ethnic and racial minorities, secular 
humanists/atheists in primarily Muslim countries like Turkey, and people of any religion 
who are disenfranchised by the global capitalist system.35 The Murabituns choose 
specifically to try to convert peoples who are negatively affected by globalization to offer 
an alternative system of economic governance that rejects usury, the underpinnings of the 
modern financial system. This is how the Murabituns ended up in Chiapas in the mid-
1990s, hoping to convert the Zapatistas; but it is also how the Murabituns ended up with 
adherents in the UK, the US, Spain, Mexico, and South Africa, Thailand, Morocco, 
Germany and Malaysia.36  
 Many prominent Muslims scholars today are or were affiliated to as-Sufi, like 
Hazma Yusuf and Aisha Bewley. However, his reach goes beyond that of close students 
because of the importance of da’wa to the Murabituns--as-Sufi claims that he has led the 
most successful da’wa of the 20th century.37 As stated before, as-Sufi has adherents 
around the world. As-Sufi believes that knowledge is the only difference between a true 
                                                
34 Abd al-Hayy Moore, “Why I Embraced Islam?” The Islamic Bulletin, Issue 8, June/July 1992. 
35 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “Address to Dallas College Students,” (speech, Capetown, Feb. 27, 2016). Other 
discourses describe these groups more specifically.   
36 As-Sufi is now based out of the Juma Mosque in South Africa. He has never been to the mosque in 
Mexico, as it was opened by two missionaries from the Murabitun World Movement in Spain. Their da’wa 
was incredibly successful in converting indigenous people in the state of Chiapas. See Marcia Hermansen 
“Hybrid Identity Formations in Muslim America: The Case of American Sufi Movements.” 
37 “Biografía,” Shaij Abdalqadir as-Sufi, 2016. 
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Muslim and a kuffar; thus, all people must be extended this knowledge.38 He cites how 
the “anti-dawa” of the media in the wake of 9/11 has actually led to an uptick in 
conversion in the US, especially among groups that are in particularly oppressed and in 
particularly unaware of Islam before the “anti-dawa.”39 Not only does he see God’s will 
in the “anti-dawa,” but evidence of the need for teaching in all corners of the world.40 In 
this way, as-Sufi has not just brought Muslims into Sufism, but brought new converts 
into the folds of Islam. His commentaries on political events help serve to universalize 
Sufi praxis without under-emphasizing more traditional Islam, as has happened in other 
mystical movements. If God can be in the fight of the Zapatistas, he can also be in the 
hearts of the campesinos Chiapanecos; if the British Parliament can serve the will of 
God, so can an artist in Chelsea; if God challenges inequality, then the oppressed have no 
room to deny Him. 
While as-Sufi’s discourses preach a universal God, he nonetheless promotes 
culturally sensitive da’wa. One of the most evident examples of this is his view of the 
veil. As-Sufi believes that the only men who police women’s dress are men who are not 
fulfilling their own spiritual obligations, usually in the form of financial sins like 
committing riba or failing to properly pay the zakat, instructing people to judge modesty 
based on the standard of “what is normally covered” --a standard they may differ (and 
may require the men to cover and not the women).41  
 As-Sufi’s writings appear to be fairly sober; in most cases, he focuses on a 
specific political event. Sometimes these analyses do not include any reference to 
                                                
38 Abdalqadir al-Murabit, Root Islamic Education, Madinah, 1993: pg. 4.  
39 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “The Ummah and America,” July 3, 2004.  
40 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “Dhalika -that is it!” Dec. 26, 2012.  
41 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “Fatwa on Women’s Head Scarves,” March 12, 2005.  
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anything related to God. Take for instance, the recent vote on independence in Scotland, 
in which the only reference he makes to religion is “All Scottish Muslims in reason must 
vote YES to be free of English rule” --with no reference to why Muslims (and not just 
Scots broadly) should do so.42 He often depends on Western scholars to argue his points, 
mapping out logically his views; his discourses do not read as particularly Sufi or 
mystical. For this reason, a comparison to Muhasibi is especially apt. Michael Sells in his 
work on classical Sufis, “the rigorous self-examination exemplified in Muhasibi’s 
psychology” did not create a “particularly Sufi world.”43 However, as-Sufi contradicts 
this claim about Muhasibi. When writing on Muhasibi, as-Sufi comments, “Harith al-
Muhasibi was almost like a policeman on himself, and is perfectly named al-Muhasibi 
because what he did was took account, on the beginning of the path, at the end of every 
day...Then he made it by the minute, and then at a certain point he said, ‘I cannot do it. I 
have got to account for every breath.’ So then he was watching every breath in 
remembrance of Allah, subhanahu wa ta’ala.”44 In this way, as-Sufi demonstrates how 
Muhasibi’s constant ruminations on his own ego is a “continual calling-into-account” that 
serves as a form of dhikr that is indeed spiritual.45 As-Sufi innovates this idea by applying 
it to a global scale. Instead of examining each of his own breaths, as Muhasibi did, as-
Sufi examines world political circumstances. In every instance, he finds some imperative 
of God--whether it be a tsunami punishing perversions of Islam, kuffar media attempting 
an anti-da’wa that only leads people to accept Islam, or a Scottish election that could 
                                                
42 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “Scotland’s Independence,” Sept. 14, 2014. 
43 Michael Sells, Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Qur’an, Mi’raj, Poetic and Theological Writings, New 
York: Paulist Press, 1995: pg. 167. 
44 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “A Commentary on Surat Al- Waqia,” May  3, 2006. 
45 Sells, 143. 
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liberate them from what as-Sufi considers a failed British state.46 Some of these 
examinations culminate in as-Sufi making statements that are incredibly controversial. 
He is unabashed about his conspiratorial views on 9/11, assigns all negative aspects of 
the modern financial system to Judaism (to the point of anti-Semitism), and polices who 
is truly “Muslim” to the exclusion of millions who would consider themselves to be so.47  
 Some of the problems with the Murabitun Movement and as-Sufi are pointed out 
by Tomás Navarro, a reporter who wrote a book seeking to expose the movement called 
La Mezquita de Babel: El nazismo sufita desde el Reino Unido la Comunidad Autónoma 
de Andalucía. Navarro was interviewed about the movement: 
Granada reporter and former Murabitun Tomás Navarro finds it a bit too eclectic, 
disparaging the movement as a “sect.” If they were Christian, he said, they would 
be comparable to the Branch Davidians of Waco. “The real Muslims, native 
Muslims or the Arabs of Andalusia, are not buying it; that’s why the Murabitun 
only capture converts, preying on weak people and going to places like Chiapas to 
confound simple-minded peasants.” As-Sufi, he said, “is a child of the Seventies: 
He went to India with the Beatles and to Morocco, had psychedelic drugs and saw 
Allah, or what he thinks is Allah, and has been peddling his vivid imagination to 
feeble people ever since.” Navarro no longer belongs to any religion. “I’m a 27th-
generation Ladino, and absolutely secular.”48 
 
What Navarro is doing is questioning the authenticity of the faith of the Murabituns. He 
claims that there is a difference between “real Muslims” and the Murabituns. Part of that 
is based on as-Sufi as a problematic leader. Navarro’s book clearly does not shy away 
from linking as-Sufi’s anti-semitism to Nazism. He also questions as-Sufi’s motives as a 
Western convert to Islam, asserting that as-Sufi’s vision of Allah was only drugs. There 
                                                
46 Abdalqadir as-Sufi, “The Failure of Democracy,” March 18, 2009.  
47 John Rosenthal, “German Public Broadcasters Promote Newspaper of Controversial Muslim Publisher,” 
The Weekly Standard, Nov. 4, 2010. 
48 Avedis Hadjian,”The Gods of Chiapas: Mexican Muslims In the Shadows of the Zapatistas,” 
International Business Times, Sept. 20, 2013.  
It must be noted that Navarro is Spanish, and his usage of the term Ladino is not connected to the racial 
caste system that arose in Latin America. 
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are plenty of religious traditions in which drug use is part of the rituals, but to Navarro, 
as-Sufi’s drug usage negates his religious ardor.49  
 I have no desire to defend as-Sufi against Navarro’s claims. He must live with the 
consequences of his anti-Semitism, and should be free to practice his brand of Islam as he 
sees fit. My concern with Navarro’s comments comes from his treatment of the 
Chiapanecos. He calls them “simple minded peasants” and implies that they are “feeble.” 
Perhaps he means that prior to conversion, the indigenous Mayans are not very 
knowledgeable about Islam. One of the converts himself says that “El mexicano tiene dos 
particularidades: está poco informado [se refiere a la mala imagen del islam en los 
medios de comunicación] y es de naturaleza creyente y tiene buen corazón.”50 [The 
Mexican has two particularities: he is not informed (of the bad image of Islam in the 
media) and is naturally a believer and has a good heart.] México has not been involved in 
any of the many conflicts that have taken place in Muslim-majority countries, even 
refusing to send troops on UN peacekeeping missions until recently. México is not a part 
of NATO, and had no part of either of the Gulf Wars or War in Afghanistan. Thus, there 
is less inducement for the media or the government to push Islamophobia as a national 
policy. Muslims are not the enemy that is killing them. Rather, a number of controversies 
with Mexican-born soldiers who enlisted in the US armed forces revealed that it was the 
US that was seen as the enemy.51  
                                                
49 There is also no mention of drugs in any of as-Sufi’s writings. That is not to say that as-Sufi never used 
drugs in either a religious or non-religious context, but I cannot independently confirm that Navarro’s 
assertion that as-Sufi’s visions of God are in anyway related to drugs at all.  
50 Jacobo G. García, “Alá en los montes de Chiapas,” El Mundo, Jan. 31, 2014.  
51 The funeral for Juan Lopez Rangel, who was killed in Iraq led to a standoff between the (armed) US 
Marines in México for his military funeral and Mexican soldiers. His wife was an undocumented 
immigrant. His complicated death shows some of the fault lines between the two countries. Alfredo 
Corchado, “Mexican-born soldiers take different paths home,” The Dallas Morning News, July 4, 2004.  
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 However, if he meant that the converts were not very knowledgeable about Islam, 
then Navarro would have no need to call them “prey.”52 Rather, he is using their 
conversion as a point against the Murabituns. The Chiapanecos were taken advantage of 
by the Murabituns; Navarro is calling them gullible. While ultimately laying the 
culpability for such trickery at the feet of as-Sufi and his “cult,” Navarro still treats the 
converts poorly. He treats them as almost animalistic, as “weak people” who do not have 
the intelligence to tell the difference between a scam and reality. Since Navarro thinks 
that as-Sufi’s beliefs are suspect, the beliefs of the converts are also suspect. Here we get 
to a problem of the authentic. If the beliefs of the leader are inauthentic, are the views of 
the followers also inauthentic? I will argue here for both authenticity and agency for the 
converts.  
 Perhaps the strongest argument for the awareness that the converts have for their 
situation is the fact that a number of converts rejected the community they were in. In 
1999, about 40 families broke away from the Murabitun movement, citing some of the 
teachings and urgings of Emir Nafia as the reason for the split. According to one of the 
men who left, Abdul-Haq, Emir Nafia told the group “que ellos no tenían derecho a leer 
el Corán; que los enfermos no se merecían el Islam ni los que lo aprendían lentamente. 
Les dijo que no mandaran a sus hijos a la escuela, que dejaran de comer tortillas ¡y que 
no trabajaran en el mercado!”53 [that they didn’t have the right to read the Quran; that the 
                                                
52 This relates to the trope of the questioning the veracity of conversion. In India converts are called “rice-
Christians” to emphasize the material over the spiritual gains. 
53 Marco Lara Klahr, “¿El Islam en Chiapas?: El EZLN Y El Movimiento Mundial Murabitun,” Revista 
Académica Para El Estudio de Las Religiones 4 (2002): 79–91. 
It is unclear why they were not allowed to eat tortillas, although possibly because many flour tortillas are 
made with pork lard. However, it is uncertain whether the tortillas made without the pork lard were still 
forbidden, or if the breakaway group make an exception to the ban on pork products specifically for 
tortillas.  
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sick were not deserving of Islam, nor those who were learning slowly. He told them not 
to send their children to school, to stop eating tortillas and to not work at the market!] 
They happened to meet a builder who was a member of the Centro Cultural Islámico de 
México (CCIM) in México City, who connected the break-off community with resources 
and guidance. If they have questions about Islam, they call or check the CCIM website.54  
 Here, we see complete awareness of the situation of the converts. They were 
displeased with the doctrine of the Murabituns and have thus started their own 
community which is not only unaffiliated with the Murabituns, but is unaffiliated with 
Sufism. While they certainly have had help from the CCIM, they are directed by their 
own leaders, men and women from amongst their own ranks. These families have clearly 
expressed agency by challenging power and forming their own community. But where 
does that leave the converts who remained with Emir Nafia? For those that were old 
enough or a part of the community in 1999, they too made a choice, as did the converts 
who left. Their choice was to stay. Yet this still excludes younger and newer converts. 
Were they duped, powerless in the face of the Spanish Muslims?  
 I have elucidated at quite a length on as-Sufi and his thoughts. I did so in order to 
demonstrate some of the controversy surrounding him, but also to point out that it is 
impossible to judge authenticity in a purely academic sense. There are certainly ways that 
we could classify as-Sufi that make him fall either within or outside what we consider to 
be Muslim. However, that classification does not change anything about the way he will 
practice or whether or not he truly believes he is a Muslim. As-Sufi’s classification is also 
irrelevant to the question of the authenticity of the Muslimness of the converts. Their 
                                                
54 Ibid.  
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participation in Muslim thought and ritual is not predicated on his adherence to thought 
or ritual. They can be pious Muslims without him being a pious Muslim and are living 
authentic Muslim lives.  
To judge the converts as authentic or unauthentic places the converts in a space 
where they must defend their actions solely for our benefit as academics. Part of what we 
are to do is to sort and to categorize in order to make sense of the world and the people in 
it. However, judgments of authenticity--even if they are simply implied, like not deeming 
a community “Muslim enough” to mention--strip the agency of the out of the hands of 
subjects who may not have the power to access academia and thus the definition of truth. 
Our judgments never exist simply for the sake of judgement: what we write intrinsically 
contributes to the ways in which people are viewed and treated. We are in a position of 
power when we write about and define subaltern subjects. Assuming that communities 
are living authentically, that they are not being duped, keeps us from writing and teaching 
about communities as if they are somehow lesser than us for not seeing the dupe. 
This of course is complicated by power, and there certainly are moments and 
communities where people are taken over and exploited by charismatic leaders. But many 
discourses doubt the authenticity of beliefs even without a discussion of the influence of 
power. The International Business Times reported:  
Despite the Islamic inroads in Chiapas, Carolina Rivera Farfán, an anthropologist 
at the CIESAS Anthropology Research Center in San Cristóbal, is not convinced 
there has been real conversion of core beliefs. “I don’t know if they are converting 
or simply switching their religious [affiliation],” she said in an interview.55 
This expresses a disbelief in the converts own words and affiliations, and also ignores 
changed behaviors. The converts cannot win: their actions cannot prove that they are 
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truly Muslim, nor can their statements about their own faith be trusted. We as academics 
should be critical of what people tell us about themselves and their own communities, 
and should seek to understand biases. However, the burden of proving that what a 
subaltern subject says about themselves or their community should fall on us. Making 
them prove to us their sincerity and authenticity only leads to contradictions like that of 
the Chiapanecos, who cannot do anything to prove their beliefs.  
 
Sufis in México City 
 In the 1400s, an Azerbaijani pir named Yahya Shirvani spread the “Khalwati 
way,” which learned from his teacher. Shirvani popularized the movement, spreading it 
to tens of thousands of followers. Further popularized by the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II 
who joined the order, one branch developed into the Halveti-Jerrahi tariqa, which was 
based in Istanbul.56  In 1980, the leader of the order, Muzaffer Ozak al-Jerrahi traveled to 
New York City from Istanbul to authorize two of his followers to teach in the new world. 
The first was Nur al-Anwar al-Jerrahi (previously known as Lex Hixon), and the other 
was Fariha al-Jerrahi (previously known as Philippa de Menil). Shaykha Fariha currently 
leads the Nur Ashki Jerrahi order, the Western hemisphere offshoot of the Halveti-
Jerrahi.  
 Philippa de Menil/Fariha al-Jerrahi is an oil heiress whose French parents 
immigrated to Houston where she was born. Her parents began privately collecting art in 
Houston, before starting to fund public art. Philippa invested millions of dollars in the 
Dia Art Foundation/Dia Center for the Arts, which she founded with her husband Heiner 
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Friedrich (now known as Haydar). Dia has sponsored numerous artists, from Andy 
Warhol, Cy Twombly, Walter de Maria, and Donald Judd, and whose board included 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer.57  
 Fariha met Muzaffar al-Jerrahi when her mother sponsored a tour of dervishes 
around the US. Already interested and studying forms of Buddhist spirituality, Fariha 
stayed in touch with the shaykh. In 1979, she and Haydar joined the order and were wed 
by Shaykh Muzaffar. While he was in New York, a woman of Puerto Rican descent 
named Edlín Ortiz Graham visited the mosque for the first time. She was 20 years old 
and working as a journalist at the time. When she said the shahada, she was renamed 
Amina Talisma.  
Fariha, but especially Nur, had training in other mystical traditions. Farhia had 
been involved with mystical Buddhism. Nur had a doctorate in comparative religions 
from Columbia University. He at one point or another was initiated by Hindu swamis, 
Buddhist lamas, and Eastern Orthodox priests, as well as with the Muslim shaykhs.  He 
called these traditions “parallel sacred worlds.”  
In 1987, Nur traveled to México City to speak about spiritual dancing. One of the 
converts, renamed Sharifa said:  
 La segunda vez que vino Nur me preguntó si tenía algún conflicto en haber hecho 
la iniciación con él y haber conocido el Islam, y no, al contrario. La tradición 
conchera tiene códigos, disciplina, reglas y es muy rica…La llegada del sheij fue 
muy enriquecedora, supe que estaba en el lugar correcto porque era lo que Dios 
había destinado para mi alma…Pertenecer a esta Orden y ser danzante es un 
compromiso muy grande…para mí, no hay impedimento ni disconformidad 
porque siempre tuve claro que…no voy a danzarle al Papa o a los sacerdotes, yo 
voy a danzarle a Dios.58 
                                                
57 Bob Colacello, “Remains of the Dia,” Vanity Fair, Sept. 1996.  
58 Cynthia Hernández González, “El islam en la Ciudad de México: La orden Halveti Yerrahi y su ritual de 
iniciación a partir de los años 80 del siglo XX,” (México, D.F., 2009): 51.  
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[The second time that Nur came he asked me if I was conflicted about becoming 
initiated with him and about having come to know Islam, and no, on the contrary. 
The Conchera tradition has codes, discipline, rules and is very rich. The arrival of 
the shaykh was very enriching, I knew that I was in the right place because it was 
what God had destined for my soul...Belonging to the order and being a dancer is 
a huge commitment...for me, there is no impediment or discomfort because I have 
been clear that I’m not going to dance for the Pope or for priests, I am going to 
dance for God.] 
 
Sharifa is referring to Concheros dance, a form of dancing that emerged in México as a 
fusion between Aztec and other Central American traditions and Catholic rites. Nur met 
with concheros to discuss similarities between this tradition and Sufi dancing. Omar, a 
dancer who converted said that “La devoción hacia un Dios verdadero, a un solo Dios 
verdadero es la coincidencia fundamental. Nuestro lema en la danza es unión, armonía y 
perseverancia, esa es una coincidencia también con la tradición sufi.”59 [Devotion 
towards a true God, to only one true God is a fundamental concurrence. Our motto in 
dancing is union, harmony and perseverance, which is also a concurrence with Sufi 
tradition.] Amina clarifies, “El sincretismo no tiene que ver con lo que pasó no buscó una 
fusión entre el sufismo y la tradición conchera él entiendo que podía enriquecer su visión 
con la tradición que encontró en sus derviches y en Mexico y viceversa.”60 [Syncretism 
has nothing to do with what happened, he wasn’t looking for a fusion between Sufism 
and Conchera tradition, he understood that he could enrich his vision with the tradition 
that he encountered, between his dervishes and in Mexico and vice versa.]  Some of the 
concheros converted, and started a community in México City of the Nur Ashki Jerrahi 
Order. 
                                                
59 Ibid., 52. 
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Eventually Amina, who was living in México as a correspondent for Univision, took over 
the responsibilities of running the order. She has started a number of interfaith initiatives 
in México, and has also studied other forms of mysticism, like her teachers.  
 What is to be made of such a group? They are certainly not the only group of 
Muslims, or even Sufis in México City. There are a number of groups, some established 
by Muslim immigrants, some connected to embassies, some founded by Mexican 
converts. There are other Sufi options as well, like the Murabitun (whom I’ll discuss at 
greater length in the following section). The Murabitun are more traditional than the 
spiritually-diverse Nur Ashki Jerrahi. It is especially interesting considering Shaykha 
Amina’s insistence that the tariqa is not interested in hybridity. Often the Nur Ashki al-
Yerráhi (the name of the tariqa in México) are excluded from academic sources about 
Islam in México, or brushed aside as more “mystical” than Islamic.  
 Shaykha Amina uses the specific term “syncretism.” Syncretism has a unique 
place in the history and study of religions. The phrase syncretism was applied to churches 
that were established in Africa but were led by African leaders, independent of the 
European Christian missionaries in order to degrade and accuse the practitioners of 
“illicit mixture.”61 The word was used in a way as to devalue Christian practices that 
were not subject to control by the colonizers, to insist that their Christian practices were 
mixed with African forms of religion, and thus not “pure” Christianity. The term is not 
neutral, and in some ways, mirrors the word “multiculturalism” in secular society. Like 
multiculturalism, syncretism is valued for its blending, and is often lauded as better than 
homogeneity, whether that be ethnic or religious.  
                                                
61 David Chidester, Savage Systems, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996): 224. 
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 A return to a discussion of the Concheros dancing will help clarify the problem of 
syncretism. Many early Spanish priests were highly suspect of the conversion of the 
indigenous people of México to Christianity. Trained in the era of the Reconquista and 
the Inquisition, Catholic priests held onto doubts about the veracity of the faith of the 
conversos and Moriscos that translated to doubts about the beliefs of the indigenous 
Mexicans they converted. Many practices that the indigenous people embraced about 
Christianity seemed based in pre-contact traditions: elaborate plays with costumes, 
images of saints/ixiptlas, alters, and of course dances like the Concheros.62 To the 
Spanish, it appeared that the indigenous Mexicans were still adhering to their old religion 
under the guise of Christianity. Different records iterate different motives to the converts-
-perhaps newness of faith, perhaps fear of the Spanish, perhaps purposeful deception--but 
nonetheless, to varying degrees, found something not completely right about their 
Catholic practices.63 The Spanish believed that the indigenous Mexicans could only be 
one, either Catholic or pre-contact religion. Yet this view of how religion operates with a 
society or culture is a very Eurocentric one.64 The Aztecs didn’t have the same 
conceptions of religion as their European counterparts. The practices that the Spanish 
would label religion were merely life, and could not be separated from other aspects of 
living. Their political system, their agricultural system, their time keeping system, their 
military system, and even the way they designed Tenochtitlán was intricately linked to 
                                                
62 Inga Clendinnen, “Ways to the Sacred: Reconstructing “Religion” in Sixteenth Century Mexico,” 
History and Anthropology  vol. 5 (1990):105-141.   
63 Clendinnen articulates the views of Franciscans Toribio de Motolinía and Bernardino Sahagún and 
Dominican Diego Durán. The first thought that it was silly for the Inquisition to try to look for idolatrous 
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enthusiastic about progress. (see pgs. 107-8) 
64 Of course the great irony of this is that European Christian practices contain a number of a pre-Christian 
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their gods and rituals that would be labeled as religious. Their pantheon was also a 
mixture of shared and more community-specific gods. For the Aztecs, Quetzalcoatl was 
borrowed from the Tollan, and Huitzilopochtli led them to the land they were gifted. 
Thus, the very idea that worshipping Huitzilopochtli and the Christian God is an import. 
The enthusiasm for Christianity was not necessarily faked; indigenous converts probably 
truly believed in many of the tenets of Christianity.  
 Indigenous practice should not be labeled syncretism because they were not 
fusing two distinct entities to create a new form that resembled both but was neither. 
Because they did not view religions in the same way as the Spanish did, the 
classifications that the Spanish brought with them did not fit neatly on the heterogenous 
practices of the conquered people. The converts who were Christian were Christian. They 
accessed Christianity through familiar routes, and practiced rituals that the Spanish 
viewed as un-Christian. That is not to say that there was not mixture of traditions, as there 
certainly was mixture. However, to look upon the practices as the Spanish did, as a 
bastard child that was neither an indigenous religion nor Christian, is an error. Firstly, 
any religion is a mixture, and mixture with indigeneity is not somehow radically different 
than the fusions that took place over centuries of praxis. Secondly, this assumes that the 
indigenous religions and Christianity occupy the same spaces in people’s lives and 
behaviors so that the resulting system also occupies the same space.  
 We can see some of the issues of those who believe in universal religion. It is 
hard and potentially impossible to regulate a religion of any scale to the point that belief 
and practice are identical across adherents. This means that there are going to be people 
who claim to be a religion but fall outside of the lines that others draw (like Wahhabist 
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judgement of Sufis). But we can also see how those who praise and rely on syncretism as 
a model make false equivalences in order to show the beauty of mixture. As an author of 
a recent discussion on the fetishization of mixed race people so aptly put it, “If we could 
fuck away white supremacy, wouldn’t it be gone by now?”65 Likewise, the mixing of 
religious traditions or cultures does not confront problematic systems of power and 
agency in the colonial process. Syncretism as a model further enforces the narrative that 
the colonized are simply reactors, as the mixtures happen without their input. On 
assuming the agency of the colonized, however, we can see how the indigenous people 
were actors that chose to embrace beliefs (that sometime originated outside of their own 
ethnic group), and certainly didn’t need to compromise between two distinct positions. 
The case of indigenous Mexicans is more complicated than Sufi converts because of the 
amount of coercion involved in their conversion. However, I stand behind the assumption 
of agency. Converts could express agency by retaining and practicing contrary to Spanish 
desires, by embracing aspects of religion they had not before, or by picking the parts that 
fit with their cosmovision.  
 Taking the same lens towards the Nur Ashki Jerrahi Sufis, one can see how their 
conversions are constructed as passive by positing that they are simply mystics. They 
have no agency in specifically choosing Islamic mysticism, or deciding in what form 
their practice will take because of the leader’s connections with other mystical practices 
and looser forms of interpretations than in other Islamic practices.66 Labeling this practice 
as syncretic goes directly against what the leaders of the movement said about the 
                                                
65 Lauren Michele Jackson, “Why A New Mixed Race Generation Will Not Solve Racism,” Buzzfeed, Feb. 
10, 2017.  
66 The sect of course is led by women, and women are often the prayer leaders. There is no separation of 
genders during prayers, nor is there a dress code. 
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movement itself. Rather than thinking as if they are confused or uncommitted, we should 
assume that they are aware of exactly what they believe and why, and that they actively 
want to believe those things.  
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Creation 
 
Colonial Knowledges 
In “America and the Colonizer Question,” Gordon Brotherston discuss about the 
scientific inadequacy of European conquistadors compared to the Aztec Empire. He 
discusses at length Aztec knowledge of astrology and their advanced calendrical system, 
both of which posed a threat to European ideas of superiority.67 The Aztecs too had a 
codified governance and justice system, complex cosmologies, and both philosophical and 
scientific advancement, and yet these systems were coded as lesser by the Europeans who 
would take power. However, these knowledges created a great deal of anxiety within the 
colonizers. Worried about new cultural, economic, and technological spaces, the Spanish 
conquerors assuaged their fears through conversion.  
Peter Hulme addresses this anxiety in his discussions of the myths of romance 
surrounding English settlements and colonies, especially the drama between John Smith 
and Pocohontas that has become so ingrained in the national imaginary. He states: 
The colonial self-image was one of cultural and technological superiority, but not 
only did European culture not  attract converts and European technology not 
produce food, but the English lower classes deserted in large numbers to the 
Indians... In such circumstances, the establishment of a colonial presence could 
only find the necessary support through massive efforts of discursive projection 
and psychotic disavowal.68 
 
The situation in México differed from that of the Jamestown because survival was not as 
perilous. There were not widespread desertions to the Aztecs, nor as much pressure on 
agricultural knowledge systems. However, this points to the ways in which anxiety leads 
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European colonizers to define the colonized as without civilization--thus denying the merit 
and weight of their knowledges.  
 Gaslighting is a term that is typically used to describe actions with an abusive 
relationship. The abuser will not only harm the abused physically or emotionally, but 
systematically manipulate the abused so that they are forced to question their own 
experiences and sanity. The play “Gas Light” and subsequent movies based on the play 
popularized the term. In the play, a husband convinces his wife that she is going insane by 
questioning her experiences--hearing footsteps in an empty apartment, convincing her that 
she is losing jewelry and other items, and ultimately, telling her that she’s imagined the 
gaslights dimming in their house. He does this in order to control her. He had murdered a 
woman in search of her jewels, and it was his search to find them that caused her to hear 
footsteps in empty rooms, and his turning on the gaslights in the attic that dimmed the 
lights elsewhere in the house.  
One of the systems of coloniality is what I will call “societal gaslighting.” What I 
mean by “societal gaslighting” is the widescale denial of certain experiences, practices and 
actions in order to make subjects of the abused society question their own knowledges and 
the sanity of practice. Although unevenly enforced and experienced, 
colonialism/coloniality don’t just work to shift identifications, but to shift them to 
identities that align with the colonizer’s goals and worldviews. A colonizer desires for the 
colonized to see themselves as the colonizer sees them, adopting the identities that the 
colonizer assigns and making the colonized question that abuses that inevitably happen 
under systems of colonialism take place. The colonized are not only abused, but are in 
manifest ways told that what they are experiencing is not abuse, forcing them into 
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questioning their own realities and narratives. That is why systems of colonialism are 
often closely tied with conversion projects; conversion makes people question the very 
essence of the way they experience the world. While the modes, methods and scale of 
these attempts look very different, in each case of colonialism, the colonizer sought to 
change the very essence of how the colonized thought of themselves as individuals, as a 
community, and within the global network.  
One of the most apparent ways this was completed through homogenizing racial projects. 
Quíjano notes that colonialism sought to reduce disparate groups into a single racial 
identity. In México, after the disintegration of the Aztec Empire, indigenous peoples from 
a variety of different traditions and cultures were categorized into a single indigenous 
identity, despite the fact that prior to that time, imagined themselves as different and 
distinct communities, with different languages, different customs, and no sense of racial 
unity. The same sort of racial reductionism was also applied to African slaves, who came 
from communities around the African continent that were politically, socially, and 
culturally distinct, and yet were forced into a singular black community. While this was 
certainly true in the Americas, it also applies to later colonialism on the African continent, 
where disparate groups were forced together for the benefit of the colonizers. Today, 
people identify themselves as part of racial groups that were devised from specific 
colonial encounters.  
 While there are limitations to the idea of “societal gaslighting,” the framework 
helps show how colonialism/coloniality changes the subjectivities of colonized people. 
The goal of systems of coloniality is not necessarily to shift subjectivities or to gaslight 
other societies. In the colonization projects of the Spanish in México, religious conversion 
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was at the heart of making the indigenous people colonial subjects. Societal gaslighting in 
this way was overt and part of governance. After gaining independence from Spain, where 
the Latin American nation-states supposedly have sovereignty over their own affairs, the 
gaslighting may appear more subtle, or at least not overtly within plans to exert power. 
And yet, the questioning of experiences and the denial of the cultural rights and 
legitimacies that stem from systems of knowledge-production other than a Western one is 
a harsh reality to this day.  
 In this section, I will argue that the revival, construction, and creation of 
alternative forms of knowledge-production demonstrate an inherent agency in those who 
produce them. I will speak to the way that converts along the border have created forms of 
existence and knowledge that challenge the U.S. hegemony, especially concerning the 
economic implications of their conversion and activism. I will touch upon the history of 
Catholic Liberation theology in Latin America and the way that converts create 
knowledge without this framework. Lastly, I will discuss the Murabitun movement in 
Chiapas, where the creation of new forms of community should be considered agential.  
 
Border Challenges 
Walter Mignolo calls upon the idea of border thinking to describe how the 
coloniality of power rules over the subject. The border technically occupies a space of in 
betweenness that stretches from the Gulf of México to the Pacific Ocean. However, the 
economic power that the US has over México allows the US government to push the 
Mexican government into extending that border throughout the country. People from 
across México, the Caribbean, Central and South America use México as a conduit to 
 
 
 47 
arrive at the US.  The US pays and pressures México into strictly enforcing immigration 
imperatives so that these people (or at least fewer of them) never reach the border. 
Immigration checkpoints have been set up around the country.  A train that many migrants 
use to travel northward referred to as la bestia, has been targeted as a way to stop people 
from reaching the border. Although la bestia already had a reputation for extreme 
danger—quick motion and sharp turns has caused many people to lose limbs or their lives 
from falling onto the tracks. The US has paid for beams to be placed low across the tracks 
to knock people off the top of the train, and also for lasers to be installed that can be shot 
at people to induce them to falling. These assertions of US sovereignty mean that migrants 
are in the state of border inbetweenness that should only constitute the liminality at the 
border for thousands of miles. Migrants in this way are subject to the powers of both 
states, but their inbetweeness does not give them the rights or protections of either. 
         Thus, when I speak of the border, I do not speak only of the physical land 
that touches, nor simply strategies of policing of said stretch of land, but of the entirety of 
the effects that stem from the idea of borders on the bodies and subjectivities of the people 
who are in some stage of liminality. The phrase fronteras, aids in understanding how 
multiple different borders overlap, change, challenge, and reinforce each other.69 
US capitalist influence is extremely evident just south of the border, in cities filled 
with US corporations and workers whom the US deported. On a purely institutional level, 
it is clear how free trade and US corporations damage the Mexican economy. However, 
the fact that the corporations can cross the border but laborers cannot shows the disparities 
between the two countries. The border regime itself is a capitalist structure built for US 
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economic benefit. After the Mexican-American War, the US has opened and closed the 
border according to their economic needs--in times of labor shortages (WWII, for 
instance), border regulations were loosened to encourage migration.70 However, when the 
US labor market is less competitive, different strategies are used to prevent migration and 
to criminalize the migrants once they arrive. People who immigrate with the blessings of 
the US government must be paid a living wage and be cared for by social services that 
range from medical care to police response; people who cross the same border are 
criminalized simply for crossing a line in el río and thus are denied guarantees like 
minimum wage and police protection. Economically, this is extremely beneficial to the 
US. US companies have a source of inexpensive labor from undocumented immigrants 
who can’t claim minimum wage.71 Undocumented immigrants also pay local and state 
sales and property tax, and in some cases, contribute income tax as well to the state or 
federal government. This creates revenue for the US that the government never has to 
invest in the care of these immigrants. Undocumented people won’t claim social security, 
Medicare, and aren’t eligible for the most basic human services, like SNAP benefits.72  
Furthermore, the border regime actively promotes racism by policing of bodies 
based solely on the color of their skin.73 People are told to “go back to their own country,” 
ignoring that the US may very well be their own country and that even if the US is not 
their country of citizenship, economic neoliberalism perpetuated by the United States has 
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driven many people here to find opportunities and safety they are denied in their 
homelands because of exploitative capitalist globalization models. These racial tropes are 
built into the US vocabulary in terms that construct Mexicans as “lazy” or “takers” or 
“gang members” and blame Mexicans for their poverty, refusing to call into question why 
many Mexicans are criminalized, why they are unable to achieve mass economic mobility, 
or why people are willing to move in order to support themselves and their families. Just 
south of the border, people see the deportation regime of the United States and of the 
maquiladoras that benefit from their cheap labor.74 Especially post-NAFTA, México and 
Mexican people are facing slow economic growth, “food poverty,” and development 
stinted by prohibitions on “protective tariffs, support for strategic sectors and financial 
controls.”75 People in northern México are likely to face these structures of coloniality that 
manifest themselves in discriminatory ways.  
Conversion efforts in Northern México have been spearheaded by people who 
were converted in the United States uniting with Muslim immigrants. Many are in México 
because either they or a close family member was deported.76 In the US, news sources 
have noted how Latino conversion has been notable in prisons and inner-city 
neighborhoods, in tandem with black conversion.77 These Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans are excluded from the dominant economy and subject to racism stemming 
from that purposeful exclusion. This is a demonstration of the appeal of Islam to those that 
are economically excluded and victims of racism. Many women also cite the effects of the 
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US patriarchy. Wendy Diaz, a Latina woman who converted to Islam, says her experience 
after conversion led her to start dressing as she felt necessary to follow her faith: “I found 
myself to be getting more respect as a woman. I would be able to go to a job interview and 
get a job based on my intelligence, not on the way that I looked. And likewise, from the 
opposite sex I wouldn't get that negative attention that a lot of women get.”78 The converts 
themselves recognize that US hegemony does not operate to serve them.79 Conversion 
serves as an active protest against these structures because it is a rejection of the status-
quo and the embrace of a theology that they can wield to fight against the oppressions they 
see and experience.  
This protest is made evident in a number of ways. Amir Carr, a former resident of 
California who left when his wife was deported, said, “Many Muslims, whether or not 
they end up in Tijuana by choice, end up staying in México rather than trying to get back 
into the United States...it's much easier to be openly Muslim here.”80 He goes on to talk 
about the prevalence of Islamophobia in the US and how people actively demonstrate 
against the building of mosques and hold prejudices about what it means to be Muslim. 
This is important because not wanting to go back into the US out of fear of Islamophobia 
constitutes a rejection of the ideology that coloniality wants people to accept. The US 
system of coloniality wants Mexicans in particular to cross the border they’ve increasingly 
criminalized so that countless industries can operate on the low-cost labor that 
undocumented immigrants provide.81 This is not a solitary means of rejection. The 
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community itself participates in a number of different methods of subtly rejecting the 
systems of coloniality. One mosque in Tijuana, for instance, runs soup kitchens for the 
poor82, veiled women handing out food on the street both a subtle reminder that capitalism 
cannot provide a living for everyone within the system and a way to solve one of the ills 
that capitalism propagates for some people. A mosque in Monterrey combats racialized 
stereotypes, saying that not all Muslims are terrorists, nor are all Mexicans “narcos.”83 A 
mosque in Guadalajara shared a Youtube video discussing environmental protections and 
how they relate to the Quran, a protest against capitalism that I have not previously 
discussed, but nonetheless counters the narrative of coloniality regarding the usage of 
environmental resources.84 A mosque in Tamaulipas seemed to call for the most direct 
anti-coloniality actions, encouraging their community to stand in solidarity with Palestine 
(against the US-Israeli regime), for the acceptance of Syrian refugees, and for women’s 
equality.85 This participation in a counter discourse gives converts a space to express and 
fight the systems of coloniality that conspire to oppress them. To fight both discursive and 
economic neoliberal pressures, converts in la frontera have embraced a language that 
gives them the power to contest the production of knowledge that allows them to be 
exploited.  
  
Liberation Theology 
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Liberation theology formally arose from the 1986 Medellín Conference where a 
group of Latin American bishops came together to discuss how and why the church was 
failing their parishioners. These ideas had been codified by a Peruvian priest named 
Gustavo Gutierrez (who had been thinking about such issues for many years) in a book 
called Teología de la Liberación.86 Gutiérrez argued that orthopraxis was as important as 
orthodoxy, and thus, the Catholic church, especially in Latin America, should promote the 
liberation of the oppressed. Gutiérrez identifies economic oppression as the most pressing 
problem in Latin America, (calling for a preferential option for the poor) but he expands 
this argument by calling on to the church to fulfill “its prophetic function of denouncing 
every human injustice” to reach a state of true liberation.87 Gutierrez claims, nothing has 
changed in Latin America since 1492 except “modifications to the systems of 
dependence” through which peoples are oppressed, a view that tightly mirrors Mendieta’s 
claim.  
Although the abuse is committed against their own parishioners, the Catholic 
church has justified nonintervention by claiming the church ought to stay out of the realm 
of the political.  To counter this, Gutiérrez cites a story from the the Biblical account of 
the Exodus as an example of God’s preference for liberation.88 The Israelites were victims 
of enslavement, stringent birth control policies and ethnic discrimination under the rule of 
the Egyptian Pharaoh. According to the Bible, God freed the Israelites by sending a 
number of plagues that destroyed the Egyptian economic and social systems (by 
devastating crops, causing illness, turning water sources into blood, for instance) that 
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culminated in the violent drowning of the Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea. These actions 
are inherently political; to pretend that God does not care about suffering and injustice 
because it is related to political systems would, to Gutiérrez, be a misreading of the 
Biblical texts.  
 Having the church on a certain side--of the powerful or the weak--grants that side 
with God’s blessing and moral consent. For this reason, Gutiérrez says that “Not to 
exercise this influence in favor of the oppressed of Latin America is really to exercise it 
against them.”89 Because he identifies capitalism as the most severe form of oppression, 
he demonstrates why the church should be opposed to it. In order to criticize the capitalist 
systems, Gutiérrez draws on Biblical texts about the early church. Jesus himself criticized 
the accumulation of wealth and a major component of his teaching was caring for the poor 
and fighting against poverty; he ultimately died as the empyrean liberator, freeing 
everyone from slavery under sin. After Jesus’s death, his disciples created a fellowship  
that provided for each other by pooling their collective wealth to care for the needs of the 
entire community--a very socialist ideal. Gutiérrez claims that Christianity and Marxism 
can be compatible. Gutiérrez criticizes how Christianity often is used to support inequity 
and systems of oppression by aligning with power structures that reinforce economic and 
political systems that conflict with these Biblical teachings. Christianity, unlike Marxism, 
argues Gutierrez, is not necessarily fundamentally opposed to capitalism, but against 
oppression, including political and economic oppression. Because the capitalist system 
perpetuates oppression by giving those with economic power political power which allows 
them to ensure further economic power, heightening a cycle of inequity, Christianity in a 
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framework of Liberation theology should be opposed to capitalism because of the way it 
enforces oppression in the modern world.  
People within and outside of the Church took issue with Liberation theology 
(exemplified by Rodney Stark, who claimed that “Liberation theology is a naive clerical 
leftist fantasy”).90 Gutiérrez’s efforts illuminate a divide between the Catholic hierarchy 
and the priests and bishops intimately involved with people on the grassroots level. 
Gutiérrez faced criticism from a number of actors within the Catholic church, who thought 
he was simply a Marxist, even garnering condemnation from Pope John Paul II and 
displeasure from Pope Benedict XVI91 (although Pope Francis has proved himself friendly 
to the Liberation theologians, and possibly is one himself).92 The difference between the 
Vatican and Latin American priests was seen very clearly during the height of the Cold 
War, when the church hierarchy cooperated with the CIA to identify thousands of priests 
and nuns that were associated with Communism, Marxism, or Liberation theology.93 In 
Latin America at the time, 80% of people lived in poverty and 90% of the people were 
Catholic; thus, grassroots Catholicism posed a perceivable threat to military dictators in 
the region. If the people were to rise up through Liberation theology and overthrow the 
military regimes, the CIA predicted that many of the newly established governments 
would turn to Communism. As of 1983, 1,500 priests and nuns had been killed, 
imprisoned, or tortured because of their associations with economic leftism--that number 
surely has risen since the article was published 33 years ago.  
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Due to the prevalence of Liberation theology before, during, and after the EZLN 
guerilla war, some scholars claim that Islam serves as a Liberation theology. This 
argument is appealing. Like Catholicism, Islam has textual basis for claiming liberation, 
and without the troubling history the Catholic hierarchy has had with Marxism. 
Like the Bible, the Quran also has a version of the Exodus story, and it 
undoubtedly serves a similar role by describing God's preference for the end of economic 
oppression for His people. Moses, who who is the prophet/intermediary with God in the 
Exodus account, is like many of the Quranic prophets in that he leads a community out of 
slavery. One only need to look at the life of Muhammad, the preeminent and final prophet, 
to discover the extent of the pervasiveness of egalitarian economics. Mecca in the years 
before Islam had grown wealthy by selling goods and services to pilgrims who came to 
worship at the Kaaba and the other deities that were held around it. The Quraysh, the tribe 
which controlled Mecca, had grown rich and powerful off of these economic ventures. 
They were originally antagonistic to Muhammad and the religion that he preached, to the 
point that he was in danger for his life because of the threat he proved to their livelihood 
by offering a religion that had no need for the idols that they controlled. Islam sprung from 
roots that were meant to speak truth to power.  
Muhammad and his adherents were forced to flee from Mecca to Medina, where 
Muhammad, informed by God and Islamic ideals, led the creation of the first Muslim 
community. In this space, Muhammad continued to demand economic justice. He 
specifically instructed the faithful to care for those in poverty, orphans, widows, travelers, 
and neighbors in need, but also created safety-nets that could care for the economically 
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marginalized groups.94 Muhammad’s role as a spiritual and political directly links 
theological impetus to state action. Creating a space for a number of identities was 
especially important to Muhammad. The community in Mecca, was built around ummah 
rather than tribal/ethnic/racial discrimination or gender discrimination because all people 
had a place in the community dependent merely on their Muslim faith.95 Participation was 
based on closeness to God.  
 One of the strongest arguments against capitalism in Islamic discourse is 
Muhammad’s declaration that riba or usury was haram or non licit. He was expressly 
against making money off of the possession of money (a practice in pre-Islamic Arabia--
riba al-jahiliyya or usury of the days of ignorance) that is ubiquitous in the modern 
finance industry.96 Many banks owned by Muslims or Islamic-leaning countries refuse to 
operate on usury because of these prohibitions. This is a direct criticism of the economic 
systems as exemplified to Muhammad through the Qurayshi modus in Mecca that can be 
extended to the present day.97 It also places the systems of Islamic finance in opposition to 
capitalist finance systems. This dichotomy has led scholars to associate Islamic economics 
with Marxism. 
Relating to Islam’s view of the capitalist world, one of the many scholars who 
claims that Islam is a liberation theology, Hamid Dasabi, discusses how Samuel 
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Huntington’s famous Clash of Civilizations theories are wrong: capitalism is the true 
oppressor. Dasabi argues:  
The battle was never between ‘Islam and the West.’ Kuwaiti sheikhs and Enron 
executives are of the same ilk, culture, and disposition; so are the inner-city kids 
from Harlem and Bronx who join the US army and the Taliban fighters from 
Kandahar. Islam of the Saudi princes is not the Islam of Algerian migrant laborers 
in France and there is no Western corner of any globe in universe that can bring 
together Park Avenue in New York City and the slums of Newark, New Jersey. 
Left to the ravages of Katrina, New Orleans looks uncannily identical to 
Baghdad.98  
 
 Throughout history, Islam has had a much less contentious history with Marxism 
than Catholicism. Because of the similar focuses of caring for the poor, many thinkers 
have found the ideologies compatible (besides Marxism’s atheist agenda that would 
obviously be incompatible with Islamic political exegesis). One prominent philosopher--
Ali Shariati--is a notable exception. From Iran, Shariati wrote a book entitled Marxism 
and Other Western Fallacies in which he disengages Islam from Marxism. He argues that 
opposing ideologies use similar frameworks; one example he uses to illustrate this are the 
genocides committed by German Nazism and Jewish Zionism. To Shariati, Marxism fell 
to the same problem as capitalism in that it revolved around material wealth and 
accumulation. While Marxism argues for a more equal redistribution of material wealth, it 
nonetheless revolves around need for capital. He agrees that while Marx was correct in his 
criticisms of capitalism, he was “wrong in the affirmative” because his system still values 
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people on their ability to produce and acquire wealth.99 He calls both capitalists and 
Marxists religious ”worshippers of capital” that are inherently at odds with Islam.100 To 
Shariati, Islam values the Unseen and closeness with God, an important distinction 
because it focuses on a system of  all-encompassing valuation that differs from Marxism, 
which admittedly, has a strong materialist flavor. Another strong criticism that Shariati 
mentions is that while Marxism is used as a tool to fight the hegemonic West, it is an idea 
system firmly rooted in Western thought and liberalism. To this effect, Marx doubtlessly 
excluded Latin America from his theories.  
Depending on a Hegelian concept of “periphery” and thus “non-historic,” Marx wrote 
scarcely about Latin America, and often only did so as a mirror of European reality, an 
exteriority--similarly to the way that he discussed any non-Western country.101 In this 
way, Marxism ought to face criticism that it too is another export of the European 
Enlightenment era, full of Orientalist themes. These criticisms have not prevented Islamic 
scholars from being explicitly Marxist. Regardless of whether one agrees in their 
compatibility, it can be said that Islamic and Marxist ideas are similar in their emphasis on 
liberation, even if they have different views for what that liberation might entail. 
While based in Catholic thought and theology, a liberation theology is not 
necessarily Catholic: it only needs to be a theology that emphasizes and practices 
liberation. Some black churches in the US, for instance, may embrace a liberation 
theology that focuses on the religious aspects of civil rights (like Martin Luther King Jr., 
who combined the roles of pastor and civil rights activist and who could possibly 
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posthumously be labeled a liberation theologist). Different factions of different religions 
have embraced feminist liberation theologies to protest injustice perpetuated by the 
patriarchy.  
Liberation theology as a form of analysis places economic class concerns at the 
center of the oppressions perpetrated by coloniality. While Gutiérrez certainly notes racial 
oppression as something that the church ought to be fighting against, Liberation theology 
places ultimate importance on economic liberation. This primacy of economics 
demonstrates part of the weakness of claiming that Islam operates as a Liberation theology 
for converts in México. The association, intentionally or not, makes the Catholicism and 
Islam essentially interchangeable. If either can liberate, why distinguish between the two 
communities at all? Religion is a secondary concern to class and power based analyses. 
However, it seems that the convergence of Islam with Liberation theology reveals the 
doctrinal biases of the academy more than it reveals anything about the nature of Islam or 
Liberation theology. Choosing Marxism (or class-based study) as a framework of analysis 
demonstrates the primacy of the economic concern to the academic. Especially because 
many of the converts to Islam were at least nominally affiliated with Catholicism in the 
strain of Liberation theology, it seems strange to assume that it was Liberation theology 
that the converts were seeking. To say that they are simply unaware of the oppressions of 
Islam because they are not local is to assume ignorance, of knowing the true limits of the 
religion.  
The primacy of geographic space reigns over this characterization. Rather than 
linking Islamic converts to one of any of the many frameworks of liberatory thought that 
have arisen or are developing from an Islamic context, it is a local liberatory movement 
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that is accredited with the conversions. The idea that certain ideologies, religious ones 
included, inhabit particular spaces is both popular and unfortunate. While surrounding 
contexts hold important sway over the way people imagine themselves, it negligent to 
assume that geographic spaces necessarily determine ideological legacies.  
This association is problematic because it also accredits Islamic praxis to Catholic 
thought. The strategy of linking subaltern actions to Western thought has a long colonial 
history.  The dominance of the French model of revolution, for instance, is 
emphasized in scholarly work. It is Alexis de Tocqueville, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the 
other Enlightenment thinkers that are read and analyzed, despite a long history of 
revolutions led by the “people” that both succeeded and failed outside of the Western 
world. Revolutionary actions by other groups are nonetheless compared to and put into 
context with the French one as the epitomic example of a true revolution. The same can 
certainly be said of Marx and Marxist thought.  Subsequent fights between the lower and 
the ruling classes have been labeled as Marxist, despite key ideological or structural 
differences that partially emerge from time/space difference and partially emerge as 
distinct situational ideological difference.  
 
The Murabituns in Chiapas 
Chiapas is one of the poorest states in México; according to the Consejo Nacional 
de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, 74.7% of the population of Chiapas 
lived in poverty in 2012.102 Chiapas is also the state with the highest population of 
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indigenous people in the country.103 One could claim that Chiapas is a colonized state 
within México--populated by a racialized other, and tasked with providing natural 
resources for the benefit of others. One third of the oil produced by México comes from 
Chiapas; considering that one third of all government expenditures are paid from earnings 
from the petroleum industry, we can see how the colonial natural resource dichotomy is 
very present in Chiapas, and in the day-to-day lives of Chiapanecos themselves, many 
who don’t have access to electricity that the petroleum they produce could potentially 
provide (in addition to the fact that Chiapas also provides around 40% of electricity from 
hydropower).104  
 The economic situation of the Chiapanecos was exacerbated by an influx of 
asylum seekers and refugees from neighboring Guatemala. In the 1950s, the US removed 
the democratically elected leader of Guatemala (who unsurprisingly was a leftist) and 
replaced him with a right-wing military dictator, Carlos Castillo Armas. The US often 
directly intervened to keep Armas and his successors in power, including bombings and 
the routine “disappearances” of leftist leaders. Racism and local support for the leftists led 
the government to commit genocide indigenous people. By the 1980s, the mass killings 
and ongoing violence drove many Guatemalans to flee into México. Conflicts arose over 
wages, medical supplies, and public safety; the US put further stress on the already 
impoverished state by pressuring the Mexican government to keep the refugees in place 
(and most certainly prevent them from reaching and crossing the Río Grande). Despite US 
involvement in perpetuating the violence in Guatemala, the US refused to recognize 
Guatemalans arriving to seek asylum as anything other than economic migrants, claiming 
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that no human rights violations were taking place in Guatemala.105 Refusing to admit 
genocide is taking place is one form of cultural gaslighting that demonstrates the 
enormous power of narrative creation that still hold under the systems of coloniality (and 
the necessity of extending colonialism from beyond beyond direct rule). Like the husband 
who told his wife she was crazy for seeing the dimming of the gaslights, the US denied the 
very genocide and violence that it helped perpetrate.  
 After the refugee crisis in the 1980s, the economic situation of Chiapas residents 
became even more strained with the tenure of President Salinas de Gotari who pursued a 
number of neoliberal measures. Land reform in the Selva Lacandona meant to break up 
communal farms in favor of more efficient corporatized agriculture meant that many 
indigenous families lost their land; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
signed two years later meant that even those who had land had no markets to which sell 
their agricultural goods. Since Méxican buyers could purchase grains tariff free from the 
US from large-scale growers.  
 According to the Center for Economic and Policy Research, NAFTA has destroyed 
small farms, slowed economic growth to paces below almost all other Latin American 
countries, and has not decreased poverty, unemployment, or increased real wages.106 The 
coalescence of the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) around these issues 
in the late mid-1990s in Chiapas demonstrates how subaltern subjects can reimagine 
themselves in order to counter coloniality. Scholars tend not to call them revolutionaries 
because the goals of the EZLN never revolved around taking over power, but rather 
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creating a counter-hegemony to the neoliberal/capitalist regime.107 They fought the notion 
of citizenship and personhood as based on economic competitiveness that codes 
indigenous people and women as less valuable.108 This distinction between taking over 
power and creating new sources of power is incredibly important. The EZLN created new 
meanings for what it meant to be Mexican, indigenous, a specific gender, and/or a 
subaltern subject.  
 Many leftist social movements do not revolve around women’s rights preferring a 
class or nationally based fights. However, the EZLN was created because of oppression of 
all indigenous people, and women played a part of the formative movement. The Zapatista 
movement created a space for indigenous women to express their political autonomy that 
did not exist prior to the movement. Women comprised one-third of the militant forces, 
and many of the greatest military victories were commanded by women. It was a strict 
rule that tasks generally coded as feminine--like cooking and cleaning--were to be shared 
equally among all, regardless of gender. Even women who could not leave to actively 
fight were able to support the cause in other ways, including operating radios and sending 
information about troop movements. These actions allowed indigenous women to 
reimagine themselves as actors, subject to different rules, norms, and customs but evading 
ones that previously oppressed them.109  
 In many communities, indigenous groups are often pointed out as particularly 
misogynistic in order to justify the imposition of social codes based on the worldviews of 
the community in power. The EZLN rewrote those codes and questioned how an 
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indigenous movement could exist without the active involvement of indigenous 
women.That is not to say that the EZLN was a perfectly egalitarian institution, nor that the 
EZLN somehow gave women a voice or somehow allowed them participate; rather, the 
EZLN served as a method through which indigenous people, including women, could 
reimagine themselves in relation to global hierarchies that they were supposed to silently 
participate in.  
 In 1994 missionaries from the Murabitun World Movement (MWM) arrived in 
Chiapas.110 The MWM is a Sufi tariqah that has a strong emphasis on da’wa and on 
dismantling the global banking system.111 The Murabitun movement is directly and 
outspokenly opposed to global capitalism and the Western hegemony intertwined with 
it.112  This includes a "total rejection of the Western capitalist banking system, to be 
replaced by an Islamic one based on the zakat, on the abolition of bank loans, and on the 
re-establishment of halal currency".113 They saw the dynamic message of the EZLN’s 
fighting from freedom from the oppression of global financial interests as aligned with 
their spiritual goals.   
Throughout its existence, the EZLN relied on tropes of Liberation theology in 
order to justify their actions. Despite the fact that Chiapas already was one of the least 
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Catholic states in the country, the EZLN nevertheless used many tropes of Liberation 
theology in their campaign--and even commented on how aptly it described their 
struggles.114 When discussing the role of the church in their movement, Subcomandante 
Marcos, the spokesperson for the EZLN, used the Exodus to describe their fight:  
Dios quiere que salgamos a la libertad, como el antiguo pueblo judío. El pueblo 
judío vivía en tierras de otro pueblo llamado Egipto...Entonces Dios habló al 
corazón de uno de los principales y le dijo: 'He visto los sufrimientos de mi pueblo, 
he escuchado el llanto que le arrancan los capataces. He bajado para liberarlos de 
los sufrimientos que están pasando y los voy a llevar a otra tierra mejor’.115 
[God wants us to leave to liberty, like the old Jewish people. The Jewish people 
lived in lands of another people called Egypt...Then God spoke to the heart of a 
one of the leaders and he said: ‘I have seen the suffering of my people, I have 
heard the cry that the foremen have torn from them. I have come down to liberate 
them from the suffering that has passed and I am going to go bring them to another 
better land.] 
 
Liberators have often used the story of the Exodus to represent their struggle. It naturally 
aligns God on the side of the liberators, bringing religious legitimacy to their cause. 
Harriet Tubman as the “Moses of her people” invokes the sense of not only rightness but 
righteousness to her actions. Regardless of the actual spiritual composition of Chiapas, 
Subcomandante Marcos affirms and draws upon a collective idea of righteous liberation 
that can exist within Christianity. While the EZLN allowed reimagination of one’s 
subjectivity away from racist, sexist, and imperialist ideas of self, it failed to promote a 
reimagination that included the religious self.  
 The Murabituns targeted missionary efforts to populations that were 
disenfranchised by a world order built upon the concepts of coloniality. They planned to 
meet with the leaders of the EZLN, but the leaders refused. They did convert a number of 
civilians and fighters associated with the EZLN. Emir Nafia, one of the Spaniards, stayed 
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behind to lead the new community.  
They created a commune in San Cristobal de las Casas that includes a carpentry shop, a 
school, a library and a mosque. In the city center, they run a pizza and espresso bar, 
multiple restaurants, and a bakery, all called Las Alpujarras after the remaining stronghold 
of rulers of Muslim Spain during the Reconquista.116 They have opened mosques in other 
cities and communities in Chiapas--namely Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Palenque, and Comitán, as 
well as other neighborhoods of San Cristobal de las Casas besides the commune where 
believers gathered to speak and pray.117 All of the converts are indigenous, primarily 
Tzotzil Mayans. The converts work and live with their fellow Muslim converts.  
 Indigenous Chiapanecos serve as an other within México. Their existence is coded 
as necessarily before nationhood. In the Mexican imaginary, all citizens are mestizos, a 
mixture of indigenous and Spanish ancestors. To be only indigenous is to exist temporally 
before the colonial encounter. Chiapas serves as an internal outside, a place where the 
state can colonize the land and bodies of the people in order to assert what it means to be 
Mexican. In surveys of urban-dwelling Mexicans, a majority of respondents felt pride in 
their indigenous roots but also expressed that they were other, a poorer other that was less 
integrated in national culture.118 The concerns that the respondents felt about indigenous 
poverty did not touch upon how poverty was enforced through continued economic 
exploitation. Indigenous people were especially associated with tourism to the ruins of 
                                                
116 “Radical Islam takes Root in Chiapas,” San Antonio Current, October 3, 2002. One article also claims 
that the restaurant sells the best olive oil in México. 
117 “Musulmanes Chiapanecos Piden Paz En Palestina,” La Razón, December 28, 2015.; Angeles Mariscal, 
“Abren mezquita en Comitán,” La Jornada, May 30, 2007.; Mirena Mollinedo, “Musulmanes En San 
Cristóbal, Se Deslindan de Actos Terroristas: Ibrahim Chechev,” Prensa Libre Chiapas, November 19, 
2015. 
118 “Percepción de la Imagen del Indígena en México: Diagnóstico cualitativo y cuantitativo,” Comisión 
Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, 2006. 
 
 
 67 
ancient architecture, a clear demonstration of the ways in which indigenous people are 
constructed as historical.  
The indigenous converts identify distinctions as well. As one of the converts notes, 
"A los indígenas les cala más el islam que a un español porque allí están sólo preocupados 
por el banco, las hipoteca..."119, [The call of Islam is stronger to indigenous people than to 
someone of Spanish descent because they are only worried about the bank, the 
mortgage…]. In this, we can sense some degree of subverting the discursive hierarchy. 
Rather than indigenous people, it is the Spanish-descended who are behind, who have not 
learned, who lack.  
 In a review of of the Murabitun World Movement, specifically in México, scholar 
Natasha Garvin relates:  
In particular women, have noted the experience of communal living..., especially 
the exclusive space for women, the feeling of protection provided by the 
headscarves, a more harmonious family life, mainly due to the prohibition of 
alcohol, a better economic situation, and a change in status relations among the 
Murabitun in which age is more important than ethnic group or gender.120 
 
Here we can see how women too have created and maintained spaces for themselves in 
ways that challenge the dominant discourse both about the way they should be treated and 
about Islam.  
 I mean to hit a more theoretical note on the way in which the formation of 
communities reclaims spaces. Unification across lines means that the actors have 
transcended whatever the border is--whether that is physical or more abstract. Just because 
the war is not fought with tanks does not mean that claiming space to occupy (even in a 
                                                
119 García, “Alá En Los Montes de Chiapas.”  
120 Natascha Garvin, “Conversion & Conflict: Muslims in Mexico,” ISIM Review 15 (Spring 2005): 18–19. 
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purely academic sense of space) is not a victory. While the converted Chiapanecos are not 
fighting in the same way as the EZLN does not mean that they are not exposing the 
weakness of places and spaces that are not built for them.  
 Although this paper refers specifically to da’wa in México City, in talking of the 
Muslim geographies of México City, the authors note, “La apropiación de lugares 
profanos como parte de este proceso de territorialización y territorialidades es importante 
para la extensión de la da’wa y la integración de un modo de vida distinto en términos no 
religiosos.”121 [The appropriation of profane places as part of this process of 
territorialization and territoriality is important for the extension of da’wa and the 
integration of a different way of life in non-religious terms.] This demonstrates the 
relationship between spiritual and physical geographies. Creating new communities is 
both a spiritual and physical act, an internal and an external one. We can also see how 
acts of transformation, of making something that was profane into something sacred is 
also a method of creation.  
 Both the converts in the north and the south face issues with coloniality and 
oppression that operate in a number of manifestations. However, we can see how talking 
solely about the way in which they are harmed ignores the multitude of ways that in which 
they have sought to heal from the damages they’ve felt, gaslit even about the injuries 
they’ve suffered. Like in the example of gaslighting, I am not trying to minimize the 
damage that an abuser does to his victim; however, I do wish to focus on the strength of 
                                                
121 David Román Islas Vela and Armando García Chiang, “La Da’wa Tenochtla: islamizando la 
Ciudad de México,” in Territorialidades y arquitecturas de lo sagrado en el México 
contemporáneo, eds. Marín Manuel Checa-Artasu, J. Jesús López García, and María Cristina 
Valerdi Nochebuena, (México: Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, 2014): 101.   This 
article also expresses some views that Islam is invading México City, even discussing “la 
penetración del islam en tierras mexicanas.” This is just to say that Islamaphobic academic 
writing is in no way confined to the US or Western Europe.  
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the survivor who creates for the purpose of liberating herself. Let us write toward an 
agency as a model of creation, rather than destruction. Rather than forming the mold of 
agency to the abuser, the abused merely a reaction, a shadow of the abuser, let us form 
agency to fit the model of the survivor, who manages to make in the face of opposition. 
The way in which the subaltern create knowledge and new communities should dictate the 
way in which agency itself is defined.  
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Desire 
 
An Argument Concerning Cosmopolitanism 
 Reports about the converts in Chiapas treat the trend with bewilderment. For 
instance, an article in the San Antonio Current claims that: 
There are whispers that Protestant Maya men are embracing Islam so each may 
frolic with four young Spanish wives to breed new warriors for a Holy War, right 
on America's doorstep. Others accuse well-heeled Gulf Arabs of buying Mayan 
souls by doling out food, shelter, and jobs to derelicts.122 
 
We can see here an application of Jenkins’s theories about the narrative around 
conversion. The conversions are discredited based upon the fact that it was for something 
in return--in this case, wives. These points to stigmatize the converts are built on tropes 
about indigenous people, starting with their base sexual nature. Indigenous people are 
more animal-like, more beastly in the colonial imagination. Thus, their motivation for 
conversion lies with their ability to have sexual relationships with multiple women 
(polygamy also a way in which colonialist constructed the colonized as backwards and 
misogynistic). Not just four women, but Spanish women. The addition of Spanish relies 
on a narrative of fear of tainting the racial purity of white women. The article could have 
said Mexican women, or left out a descriptive all together, but the choice to emphasize 
the Spanishness--and thus the whiteness--of these women promotes racial fears of the 
tainting of white womanhood. The sexual encounters leads directly to jihad, linking 
directly to associations between the tainting of purity and attacks on American 
civilization. It also relies on racialized fears of white Americans who see the higher birth 
                                                
122 “Radical Islam Takes Root In Chiapas,” San Antonio Current, October 3, 2002.  
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rates of American people of color as a threat. The word “breed” especially evokes this 
idea of animalness that is ascribed to indigenous people.  
 The unsubstantiated claim that Islamic extremist groups are using México as a 
staging ground to wage war against the US plays on the fears of both the putative 
permeability of the border and of Muslim terrorists. A number of nationally recognized 
politicians (Rick Perry, Mitt Romney, Marco Rubio, to name a few examples) as well as 
many conspiratorial right-wing online communities have promoted the idea that terrorist 
groups like ISIL are staging operations in México to attack the US.  
That indigenous people are reduced to “derelicts” relies on a stereotype of 
indigenous poverty (without mentioning that historical and current political and economic 
structural barriers that prevent them from achieving and maintaining communal economic 
success). The indigenous men convert in order to have “food, shelter, and a job.” Islam is 
not the appeal, but material possessions. Oil rich Arab men can provide these 
inducements; the logic goes that if it had been wealthy Indians the community would be 
Hindu, or wealthy Israelis would cause the community to embrace Judaism. The 
interchangeability of the religions relies on that converts have not “truly” converted; that 
they exist in the same spaces and occupy the same discursive realities that they did 
before, with the same desires and cosmologies. Besides, the article is careful to mention 
that they are Protestant Maya, implying that perhaps there has been a previous 
conversion. Islam is just the current preference, one in a sequence of many. The 
indigenous people in this sense can never truly be Muslim because they are delineated by 
a specific geographic space. Their indigenousness will always predetermine any 
perception of religious views.  
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This article is written to evoke fear of indigenous people, relying on unspecified 
“whispers” while simultaneously denying any theological appeal that Islam might hold 
for the converts. These functionalist discourses seem to sever any reasoning beyond the 
economic, rather than relying on a more complex picture of the multiplicitious 
possibilities of desire. The emphasis is completely on the trade, a conversion for 
something in return. While this article is very blatant about the trades made, it is not 
unusual for scholars to rely on less-blatant but still damaging discourses that Jenkins 
identifies. Academic articles do not make such flagrant conjectures nor promote outright 
lies about converts. Most take the approach of analyzing conversion from a postcolonial 
lens. Take for instance the work of Camila Pastor de Maria y Campos, an academic who 
studies Muslims in México, that claims that the reason that the appeal of Islam to 
Mexicans is so strong because: 
In a postcolonial setting, where hierarchies of race, class, and "civilization" index 
and constitute each other in complex ways, conversion allows new Muslims in 
Mexico to step outside of local ideologies of dominance and difference. It offers 
the opportunity to sidestep, to circumnavigate discourses that define them as 
subaltern, by establishing direct access to far-away regions and the privileges of 
foreignness and cosmopolitanism through faith.123 
 
Pastor de Maria y Campos’s scholarship seems to allow for and show agency. She 
addresses the oppressions that continue to endure against subaltern subjects and how 
conversion allows subversion of those hierarchies. This is obviously a stark contrast to 
some scholarship about conversion that leaves converts as passive vessels upon which 
new religious identities are written. Rather, Pastor de Maria y Campos argues that 
converts have the power to subvert oppressions that permeate every aspect of convert’s 
                                                
123 Camila Pastor de Maria y Campos, “Guests of Islam: Conversion and the Institutionalization of Islam in 
Mexico,” in Crescent Over Another Horizon, ed. María del Mar Logroño Narbona, Paulo G. Pinto, and 
John Tofik Karam (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015): 146.  
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lives. This characterization falls very much within what I am arguing--of the assumed 
intrinsic power of subaltern subjects. It is the method that she claims that converts assert 
their agency that is problematic. She claims that the way that converts fight these 
discourses is “by establishing direct access to far-away regions and the privileges of 
foreignness and cosmopolitanism.”  
 In order to fully dissect the implications of “the privileges of foreignness and 
cosmopolitanism” we ought to define both foreignness and cosmopolitanism. Foreignness 
is the idea of outsideness, of something coming from a geographic space that is not one’s 
own, derived from the Latin word for “door.”124  Cosmopolitanism is more ideological 
but is related to this concept of foreignness. I will rely primarily on Kwame Anthony 
Appiah’s views of cosmopolitanism because they are both well-expressed and influential, 
although as he notes, the ideological components have existed in some form for centuries. 
He argues that cosmopolitanism is an ethical way of living with difference, of fallibilistic 
and changing attitudes, of getting used to other ways of doing things.125  
 To label Islam as something that belongs to “far-away regions” essentializes the 
religion to its Arabness and to detract from its universality. By claiming foreignness, it 
constructs Islam as a non-universal ideology that is for other people, and not for 
Mexicans. Islam has always had a complicated relationship with Arabness--there isn’t a 
non-Arab Muslim society that has not in some way engaged with what role Arab culture 
and tradition is supposed to have upon the practices of Islam. Neither is their consensus 
                                                
124 Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “foreign.” 
A similar idea is true of extraño, the word in Spanish for foreign, which is derived from roots that mean 
“outside of.” 
125 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers (issues of our time),  (WW 
Norton & Company, 2010). 
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on the issue, of the role in cultural context in interpretation. However, converts in México 
are not trading their geographic and ethnic identities to become Arab.  
 Similarly, cosmopolitanism is not an intrinsic human desire. The desire for 
cosmopolitanism, for wanting a universalism where people embrace differences stems 
from a specific time and place. When people seek cosmopolitanism, they often do so by 
increasing surface level identifications with otherness perhaps by eating “ethnic” food or 
by studying abroad. That is not to say that cosmopolitanism is not an ethical approach to 
globalization, but rather that to demonstrate cosmopolitanism is to engage with other 
social or cultural systems through a hierarchical positionality that allows certain people to 
“understand” others’ cultures because of short encounters with those cultures. Take for 
instance the emphasis on study abroad in academia as a value symbol of hierarchal 
cosmopolitanism in which people on the top of hierarchies (like civilizational or class) 
engage with difference for a short of amount of time for their own edification.  
It is not that I take issue with Pastor  de Maria y Campos’s supposition that 
“foreignness” and “cosmopolitanism” provide certain privileges to those who can access 
these traits. It is uncontested that Islam is foreign in that it has its origins in the Arabian 
Peninsula and cosmopolitan in that it offers educational, travel, and networking 
opportunities inaccessible to converts previously. However, her commentary implies that 
the converts believe Orientalizing discourses about Islam. There are plenty of ways to 
express cosmopolitanism or foreignness within the capitalist system that don’t require 
conversion--as evidenced by the rise of “Mideast fever” in Latin America, where people 
prove their cultural capital by exploiting Orientalized products that represent the Middle 
East. 
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 In the following chapter, I will explore some of the ways in which Latin 
Americans engage with Arabness, Islam, foreignness and cosmopolitanism in order to 
demonstrate why Pastor de Maria y Campos’s ideas are insufficient in describing the 
motivations of conversion. I argue that there are ways to express agency through 
cosmopolitanism for non-converts as well as there are ways for converts to express 
agency without cosmopolitanism.  
 
“Seamos Moros” 
 While conversion to Islam in México has been a relatively new phenomenon, 
Islam may have come to México as early as the sixteenth century. For centuries, Spain 
was ruled by a Muslim Almoravid dynasty.  In 1492, as Columbus was encountering 
what would later be named the Americas, his patron country of Spain was completing the 
Reconquista, driving out Muslims and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish 
brought their ideas of classification of difference with them, calling mixed-children 
“Moriscos,” the word used for Muslim converts to Christianity during the era of the 
Inquisition. Because of the Reconquista and the Inquisition, many scholars speculate that 
Muslims might have arrived in México with the early conquistadores, driven to hide their 
religion to avoid persecution.126 Regardless, Islam has definitely been present in the 
Western Hemisphere since the arrival of African Muslim slaves in the late 16th 
century.127  
Although there were some Muslim slave revolts, under the force and weight of 
Christianity or new hybridized religions, Muslim practice mostly remained either deeply 
                                                
126 Mark Lindley-Highfield of Ballumbie Castle, “Islam in Mexico and Central America,” 155.  
127 An estimated 2.25-3 million African slaves in the Americas were Muslim. Diouf, Sylviane. Servants of 
Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas, (New York University Press, 1998). 
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underground or petered out. Islam began to flourish in Latin America with both high 
immigration from the lands of the Ottoman Empire as well as the transportation of 
laborers from British colonies in South Asia to British colonies in the Americas.   
This shared history has played prominently in the Latin American imagination, 
and has attracted calls for Arab-Latin post-colonial solidarity, especially from Muslim 
countries that were fighting independence battles. Hisham Aidi discusses a few of the 
more prominent examples of this appeal.128 Cuban writer José Martí famously said 
“Seamos moros! [Let us be moors]” as he expressed solidarity with an anti-Spanish 
independence revolt in Morocco, saying that together Cubans and Moroccans both faced 
Spanish oppression. Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez both have claimed and promoted a 
mix of Moorish and African Muslim roots in themselves and their constituencies. There 
is a general sense that Latin American identity is closely linked to Muslim identity. 
Spanish culture that had its roots in centuries of Muslim rule, African Muslim slaves, and 
Muslim immigrants.  
Today this is evident in fascination with the links, as people note the shared roots 
of words like inshallah and ojalá or gastronomic similarities like shawarma and al 
pastor.  This is to say that Islam is not foreign to Latin America generally or México in 
particular. In order to construct Islam as foreign, one must ignore the long history and the 
role that Islam has played in the imagination of self in Latin America. In what way is 
Islam more foreign to México than Christianity? Neither emerged from the geographic 
space that is now México, and to act as if Christianity is some sort of natural religious 
outpouring is to deny the colonial legacy that created the Christian context. Catholicism 
                                                
128 Hishaam Aidi, “‘Let Us Be Moors’: Islam, Race and ‘Connected Histories,’” Middle East Research and 
Information Project 33, no. 229 (Winter 2003). 
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is part of the imaginings of what it means to be Mexican, and those imaginings were 
created as part of a continuing colonial project and are reinforced in coloniality.  
 
Kozmopolitanizm  
A Turkish television interpretation of A Thousand and One Nights (“Binbir 
Gece”) that was dubbed in Spanish was incredibly popular when broadcast in México and 
across Latin America as “Las mil y una noches.”  Turkish dramas have found a wide 
audience--the success of “Binbir Gece” was followed by a number of popular dramas: 
“Muhteşem Yüzyıl” (“Suleimán, el gran sultán”), “Fatmagül'ün Suçu Ne?” (“¿Qué culpa 
tiene Fatmagül?”), “Aşk-ı Memnu,” “Karadayı,” and “Kara para aşk,” to name a few. 
When asked about the popularity, a number of reasons are cited. Some viewers and 
commentators mention that Turkish people look physically similar to Latin American 
audiences, with tendencies to darker brown hair and dark eyes that make the actors 
relatable. Others remark on the social similarities between Turkey and Latin America, 
claiming that so called “developing” countries face problems like rural to urban migration 
and integration into a new global “modernity.” Others still remark on cultural similarities, 
remarking on the centrality of family, and of less sexualized and violent plots than 
American dramas, or more intimate and slow moving character development.129 I will not 
argue that having actors that look like the audience, that not feeling disgusted or 
uncomfortable with graphic violence or nudity, or a certain intimacy with characters is 
not important in enjoying television shows. However, I will argue that in addition to the 
aesthetic similarities and preferences that are expressed, the popularity of Turkish dramas 
                                                
129 For examples, see Ziyad Varol, “The Success story of Turkish TV series in Latin America,” Daily 
Sabah, Feb. 2, 2016. Esra Gürmen, “How Turkish Soap Operas Took Over The World,” The Fader, March 
1, 2016.  Didem Tali, “An unlikely story: Why do South Americans love Turkish TV?” BBC, Sept. 8, 2016. 
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(and specifically “Binbir Gece”) offer an accessible cosmopolitanism for Latin American 
viewers.  
 It is important to note that neither “Binbir Gece” nor any of the other Turkish 
dramas are being exclusively exported to a Latin American audience. In fact, the shows 
have reached audiences across the Arab-speaking world, eastern Europe, southern and 
southwestern Asia, the former USSR, and occasionally western Europe. Each of these 
places surely have a specific and unique relationship with Turkish dramas. The 
Macedonian government, for instances, has passed legislation to ban the dramas, the 
Information and Society Minister that “Turkish servitude for 500 years is enough” for the 
Balkan nation.130 Similar concerns have been taken up in Greece and Egypt, where 
nationalists have called for boycotts of the show. Gulf Arab men have responded b 
seeking facial hair implants to display their virility and at the best of their spouses, who 
ask them to groom like their favorite male characters.131 That is not even to mention the 
complicated relationship between fundamentalist Islamists who take issue with which 
Muslims are portrayed in television: drinking alcohol, pre- and extramarital sex, and 
unveiled and strong women amongst the most noted points of contention. It is not within 
the scope of this paper to comment upon the ways in which Turkish shows offer (or do 
not offer) an accessible cosmopolitanism to viewers outside of Latin America. I do want 
to ensure to demonstrate that a single show can have a number of different “decodings” 
to use the framework of Stuart Hall.132 I will be analyzing one of these decodings, and 
how it affects the Mexican viewer of said shows.  
                                                
130 “Macedonia bans Turkish soap operas,” Hurriyet Daily News, Nov. 14, 2012,  
131 Piotr Zalewski, “As Turkey Turns,” Slate, Aug. 16, 2013. 
132 Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Culture, Media, Language, (University of Bingham, 1980): 128-
138. 
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 The series begins with Şehrazat Evliyaoğlu, a widowed architect who lives in 
Istanbul, searching for 200,000 Turkish liras for her young son’s cancer treatment.133 Her 
husband’s family, who is wealthy, disowned the couple and refuse to pay, and Şehrazat 
cannot get a loan.134 She approaches her boss, Onur Aksal, a successful businessman who 
is bitter over women because his fiancé cheated on him. He offers her the money if she 
agrees to spend the night with him, a plan that he comes up with partly out of desire and 
partly to prove himself right that women are selfish. The siyah gece or black night 
overshadows the rest of the series and their continuing tumultuous relationship.  
 Brent Peterson, in “Turkish for Beginners: Teaching Cosmopolitanism to 
Germans,” analyzes “Türkisch für Anfänger,” a television show about a mixed German-
Turkish family.135 He explains how the show, targeted toward adolescents, sought to 
teach cosmopolitanism to a young German audience by demonstrating sympathetic and 
relatable German-Turkish characters and how German characters learned to interact with 
them. Similarly, “Binbir Gece” seeks to teach Turks how to be cosmopolitan.  
“Binbir Gece” should not be disconnected from its context in Turkey. Despite 
focusing on the numerous problems of the cast of characters, the show is careful to 
portray a certain vision of the Turkey. Over just 90 episodes, the characters suffer a 
number of tragedies: a shooting spree that kills numerous employees besides two separate 
attacks on two different characters with guns, a plane crash, multiple car crashes, a 
stabbing, two successful kidnappings as well as an attempted one, a voyeuristic stalker, 
                                                
133 The series can be watched dubbed in English on Netflix through about halfway through the series. The 
Spanish dubbed version can be found on the website for El Trece, an Argentinian television station. 
134 Şehrazat is the Turkish version of Scheherazade, the name of the protagonist/primary 
storyteller in 1001 Nights.  
135 Brent Peterson, “Turkish for Beginners: Teaching Cosmopolitanism to Germans,” in Turkish German 
Cinema in the New Millennium, eds. Sabine Hake and Barbara Mennel, (Berghahn Books, 2012): 96-108. 
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three cases of cancer, a heart attack, several robberies, multiple deaths, affairs, fist fights, 
suicide attempts, white collar crimes, multiple divorces, and a miscarriage, to give a brief 
idea. However, the Turkish government is only criticized in one brief scene, when one of 
the main characters says that although the government knows what to do to solve the 
financial crisis that is bankrupting his company, that they have not yet done it. Otherwise, 
the apparatuses of state are always on their side, or at least unquestioned. For example, 
Şehrazat never questions the high price of her son’s treatment even with insurance. The 
police are always helpful and there are no hints of corruption within the police or the 
government. 
Perhaps more telling than the brief mentions of the state are the relationships with 
foreigners and other countries that reveal the way Turkey is imagined in relationship to 
the world.The bone marrow donor that saves Şehrazat’s son, Mihriban, is Azeri, and 
other characters often comment on her interesting phrases or accent. Part of the urgency 
in Şehrazat procuring the money is that a Swedish family was trying to get Mihriban to 
save their family member. At her arrival, Mihriban says that she is glad she ended up in 
Turkey rather than Sweden because Turkey is her homeland. Şehrazat convinces 
Mihriban to stay and help take care of Kaan once she finds out Mihriban was widowed in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that her son died from cancer. Mihriban as a 
character is a symbol of greater pan-Turkic solidarity. Not only does she actively express 
that Turkey is “homeland,” her enduring connection to the Turkish characters is 
predicated on a war that helped solidify pan-Turkish sentiment in both Turkey and 
Azerbaijan.  
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  Bınyapı Holding, the company that Onur runs, does business with a number of 
regional partners in a way that reinforces the narrative of Turkey as an intersection. They 
designed and built award winning towers in Dubai, power plants in Almaty, along with 
unspecified projects in Moscow, Ukraine, Germany, Azerbaijan, as well as in Turkey. 
The in-betweeness of Turkey, the idea of Turkey as a bridge that crosses both cultural 
and geographic boundaries, is reinforced in the projects that Onur and the other 
characters work on. On a more basic level, we can see a Turkish vision of itself in the fact 
that it is a reimagination of 1001 Nights, a narrative that is viewed as very “Middle 
Eastern” (despite disdain for the text in many Arab contexts136) but has sparked the 
imagination of the West. 1001 Nights is often quoted at length by Onur, sometimes in his 
thoughts and sometimes aloud to other characters. Embracing and taking a classic Middle 
Eastern story represents the imagined relationship of roots that stem from the Middle East 
but express that Turkey is firmly situated in a modern context.  
 These expressions may not be clear to someone who is unfamiliar with Turkey or 
Turkish politics. A person may not have heard of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or even 
be aware that Azerbaijan is a primarily Turkic country. Someone may not know that 1001 
Nights was not written in Turkish and that what Onur is reciting is a translation, or the 
contentious relationship that Turkey has as being both not-Western-enough for Europe 
and too-Western for countries dominated by more hardline Islamist governments. Thus, 
while these expressions do promote a form of cosmopolitanism, I would not label them 
an accessible cosmopolitanism because they require some form of specific knowledge.  
                                                
136 Faten Morsy, “Thus Spoke Shahrazad: Contemporary Arab Women’s Rewritings of The Nights,” in 
Genre: Women, Sexuality, and Early Modern Studies 28 (2007): 234.  
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 Rather, it is the forms of difference that do not require some form of pre-
knowledge that make Turkish dramas accessible cosmopolitan. Take for instance 
“Muhteşem Yüzyıl” (which literally means “magnificent century” although it was 
broadcast in Latin America with names like “Suleiman, the great sultan” or the “The 
great sultan”) a Turkish drama about the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman. The 
drama does contain a great deal of historical context, but the show is ultimately driven by 
the relationships between Süleyman, his wives and mistresses, his friends and advisors, 
and their families and lovers. The frame of reference for the series is undeniably both 
temporally and spatially distant from Latin American viewers. However, it is the very 
ability to understand difference that is valued as a demonstration of cosmopolitanism.  
 “Binbir Gece” gives viewers a taste of some uniquely Turkish practices and 
customs. Even the sweeping overlooks of İstanbul that are used to transition between 
scenes portray information--from famous landmarks like the Ayasofya and Galata Tower, 
to the cats that roam the streets. Away from plot devices, there is hardly a scene that does 
not in some way involve tea--either someone inquiring if someone would like tea, making 
tea in the double-leveled çaydanlık or else someone drinking from the iconic tulip shaped 
glasses--giving a glimpse of why Turkey has the highest consumption of tea per capita 
world wide.137 An İstanbul specific example is the prevalence of water. Onur’s apartment 
overlooks the Asian side of the Bosphorous Strait, and both his mother’s home and the 
house he will eventually share with Şehrazat sit right on the banks of the European side. 
Kerem, his business partner, lives on a boat. Beyond these dwellings, the water is often a 
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backdrop for arguments and reunions and revelations.138 These scenes serve not only as 
geographic markers, but show the natural beauty of the city and the centrality of water to 
living there.  
 Through the details that are shown through the series, one can construct an idea of 
İstanbul. Şehrazat’s brother-in-law’s mistress gets her fortune told from her coffee 
grounds. Kaan’s school has a prominent sculpture of Atatürk. Şehrazat’s father-in-law 
produces and sells leather products in a market, where he bargains with the customers, 
plays backgammon with his fellow shop-owners, and casually puffs on nargile. He also is 
always carrying around tespih, beads that are used to help with prayers. Other than his 
tespih and the occasional appearance of a mosque in the background, there are very few 
visual cues that show the main characters as religious. None of the main characters wear 
a headscarf, although the occasional minor character does (especially those who come 
from rural areas).139  However, the characters often invoke God, both colloquially 
(inşallah or maşallah) and seriously when discussing sin, blessings, and punishment. 
Even the treatment of the all of the children by both family members and strangers gives 
a small glimpse into the value of children in Turkish society. One could say that these 
markers are familiar differences, actions that are different enough to be noticed but not so 
strange as to be completely incomprehensible. Şehrazat’s father-in-law is not carrying a 
rosary, but his actions are understandable without an overt explanation (nor does the 
show offer one). 
                                                
138 One water-centric scene shows Onur reading the diary of Yasemin, his ex-girlfriend from his college 
years. They encountered each other professionally when she returned to İstanbul. The diary was given to 
Onur after Yasemin committed suicide. He read that she was desperately in love with him. Guilty that he 
might have in some way contributed to her death, he throws the diary in the Bosphorus, along which he was 
sitting while he read the diary.  
139 The head scarves are tied around the neck and are not the türban style that was banned for many years 
in public institutions in Turkey, and is more controversial.  
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 These details among others mark to some degree what it means to be İstanbullu. 
Each of the details allows audiences to produce knowledge about societies that they may 
never encounter personally. “Binbir Gece” and other dramas give Latin Americans a 
chance to prove their cosmopolitan credentials. In a world where being a cosmopolitan is 
valued, it is not necessarily easy to demonstrate that one is able to both understand and 
embrace difference. Like in Abu-Lughod’s work on the construction of subjectivities in 
Egypt by women watching melodramas, Turkish television allows Latin Americans to 
reimagine themselves as part of a cosmopolitan order.140 Especially for people who do 
not have access to prove cosmopolitanism in several established ways--through travel or 
studying cultures in an academic setting--watching foreign dramas lets viewers produce 
knowledge about difference and others.  
 As stated before, “Binbir Gece” is important to Latin America because it was the 
first widely popular telenovela turca. The actors who played Onur and Şehrazat, who fell 
in love while filming the series and married after its completion, have made several tours 
to Latin America together to raving fans.141 Through an analysis of the themes of “Binbir 
Gece,” one can see two effects at work. The first is that part of the appeal of “Binbir 
Gece” is that it offers difference in an engaging way that does not require traditional 
modes of accessing cosmopolitanism. The other that implied is that watching is a form of 
agency. We can see through the framework of Abu-Lughod how watching dramas allows 
the audience to shape their own subjectivities. However, beyond the self, the act of a 
                                                
140 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Egyptian Melodrama--Technology of the Modern Subject?” in Media Worlds: 
Anthropology on New Terrain, eds. Faye D. Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2002): 115-133. 
141 Constanza Hola Chamy, “Cómo Turquía está cambiando el mercado de las teleseries de A. Latina,” 
BBC, Sept. 3, 2014. “Sherezade y Onur, pioneros de novelas turcas en Latinoamérica,” El Universo, Nov. 
14, 2015.  
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community watching and transforming something into its own contexts is agential.142 
Latin American watchers are not passively watching imported television, but learning, 
observing, and transforming the messages and tropes that they see on screen. 
 
Productions about the Middle East 
 Besides consuming cultural products from the Middle East, Latin America 
produces cultural products about the Middle East. Jewelry and clothing patterns that are 
portrayed as Middle Eastern are extremely popular, and people throw Middle Eastern 
themed parties.143 While these trends could be studied on their own (probably most 
effectively with ethnographic research), I will focus on visual representations of the 
Middle East produced in Latin America.  
In “El privilegio de amar,” a Mexican soap opera, the main character interacts 
with a bushy-moustached turco who tries to cheat her out of money at his shop. Alfaro 
Velcamp comments on how the character claims that the vendor is “cheap.”144 The trope 
of a scheming Middle Eastern shop owner is incredibly pervasive. However, there are 
newer interpretations of the Middle East/Middle Easterner that do not fit solely into the 
“slick, mustached, shop-owner” stereotype that warrant consideration. 
 There are countless references to the Middle East in music, but I will point to 
music videos of the most blatant examples: Los Master Plus in “Suave Leve” and  Don 
Omar in “Salio el Sol” and “Belly Danza,” which both use the same musical themes and 
                                                
142 Don Kulick and Margaret Wilson, “Rambo’s Wife Saves the Day: Subjugating the Gaze and Subverting 
the Narrative in a Papua New Guinea Swamp,” Visual Anthropology Review vol. 10 no. 2 (1994). 
143 See Aidi for more information on “Mideast fever.”  
144 Theresa Alfaro Velcamp, “Mexican Muslims in the Twentieth Century: Challenging Stereotypes and 
Negotiating Space,” in Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad 
(Oxford University Press, 2002): 278.  
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much of the same footage for the music video.145 None of the lyrics of any of the three 
songs refer explicitly to the Middle East; it is visual clues like clothing and landscape that 
demarcate the videos as “Middle Eastern.”  Los Master Plus is a Mexican duo and “Suave 
Leve” was released in 2014. The music video shows the pair captured by a woman who is 
wearing almost nothing besides the headscarf, and a few matching pieces of fabric to 
cover her genitalia and her breasts. Other women are wearing long dresses and 
headscarves that cover their mouth, or else belly dance in the background unveiled inside 
the woman’s opulent palace. The singers are shown in long thawbs with leopard-print 
keffiyehs that are topped with cowboy hats. The ruler-woman has a man beheaded before 
she is presented with the two singers. Upon seeing them, she removes the veil from her 
mouth and licks her lips suggestively. After several sequences of choreographed fighting 
and more belly dancing, the singers escape and run away with one of the servants and one 
of the guard women, taking the truck that was used to kidnap them. The lyrics of the song 
relate to the singer’s appeal to women, and it’s clear in the video how both women-ruler 
and those in her household are seen as potential sex objects. Why is the ruler only 
wearing a headscarf? For whom are the belly dancers dancing--they are never shown 
dancing for the ruler.  There is not a clear textual reason for the music video to take place 
in an unspecified Arab world. The appeal must be that there is something gained from 
showing the world as particularly Arab. The music video is not trying to show the 
oppression of Muslim women--while she is incapable of keeping a hold of the singers, 
the ruler is otherwise demonstrated as having complete control. There is a very strong 
message about the relationship of the singers to the imaginary Middle East. The singers 
                                                
145 Although one might think that Omar is a nod to a Middle Eastern past, there is no evidence that the 
Puerto Rican singer has any roots in the Middle East or North Africa.  
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are captured (but also captivated) by exotic Arab women. The women in turn are 
charmed by the singers and help in their escape and ultimately participate in it. In this 
way, all of the four are liberated, and drive away together. The video is both silly and 
deeply Orientalist, but still manages to show cosmopolitanism--four people coexisting 
with each others differences.  
“Salio el Sol” seems to be a nod to some post-apocalyptic world. People are in 
modern but tattered clothing dance hip-hop among the ruins of an old brick structure, and 
turbaned men in a market appear to be either stealing or concealing goods. In “Belly 
Danza,” the video begins with a knight, or perhaps crusader, dueling with an enemy 
before entering a castle in search of a mysterious belly dancing fortune teller. Both of the 
videos have the same footage of Don Omar sitting upon a throne, clutching a golden 
scepter in the shape of a snake. Around him, women adorned in feathers and bedlahs 
dance. One of the women is holding a large snake over her shoulders. Most of the dancers 
have strange makeup, bejeweled and colorful, and hairstyles like braids across the face.  
 It is important to note that the “Middle East” that is portrayed and each of Don 
Omar’s videos does not appear to be a contemporary one. Rather, “Salio el Sol” happens 
in a post-apocalyptic future and “Belly Danza” happens in a past. The unity of the 
footage implies a certain timelessness: that from the past to some distant future there is 
some enduring exoticism of the Middle East.  Although the tone of “Suave Leve” is much 
lighter, many similar scenes occur in the modern presentation of the region, adding to this 
endurance of sensuality and opulence that is part of some of the oldest Orientalist 
discourses. The blatant orientalization does not detract from the fact that these music 
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videos are a way to contribute to a global music    scene.146 Despite the problematic 
aspects (of which there are many), the videos let viewers participate in a demonstration of 
a higher degree of worldliness and connection.  
 Musical icon Shakira is a prime example of this connectivity. Born in Colombia 
to a Lebanese father and a Spanish mother, the pop star bases her songs on Arab and 
Latin American stylings. Her music had brought her incredible success both in South 
America and around the world. She is famous for belly dancing in her music videos or in 
concert, a form of dance coded as traditionally Middle Eastern. She has been labeled a 
truly global singer, with roots in Colombia, Lebanon, the US, and Spain (where she 
currently lives with her partner, Gerald Piqué, a defender for Barcelona FC).147 While her 
popularity can not be attributed to her ability to bridge the Middle East with Latin 
America, she nonetheless represents a facet of the commercial popularity of Latin 
American cosmopolitanism that she represents because of her access to an exterior, 
global culture. 
 However, the connection between cosmopolitanism as a capitalist value is 
perhaps most evident in Latin American productions of TV shows with “Middle Eastern” 
themes: the epitome of which is El Clon, a Brazilian drama (O Clon) that was remade by 
the US network Telemundo and premiered around Latin America.148 The main character, 
Jade, is a Muslim woman living with her mother in Miami. Her mother’s sudden death 
leads her to live with her conservative uncle and his family who reside in Morocco. Her 
uncle invites an old friend from his university days to discuss the morality of the friend’s 
                                                
146 The Middle East is not the only place to receive orientalist treatment in music videos. Take for instance 
“Ginza” by J. Balvin or “Desde esta noche” by Thalía ft. Maluma for examples of the orientalization of 
East Asia.  
147 Manfred B. Steger, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
148 El Clon is available on Netflix with English subtitles.  
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newest project: human cloning. Lucas, the son of a business partner and investor in this 
venture happens to tag along, and makes dramatic eye contact as Jade belly dances in the 
women’s section of the house. They fall in love, but are thwarted by the death of Lucas’s 
twin brother and Jade’s forced marriage to another man. Unbeknownst to them, the old 
friend cloned Lucas because he missed his twin. Twenty years later, when Jade 
reencounters Lucas, she must choose between the actual Lucas she fell in love with, but 
who is older and more damaged, and the young Lucas clone, who fits with her memory of 
who Lucas is supposed to be. 
The series has much of the drama that one would expect from a soap opera--
Lucas’s twin accidently slept with his father’s fiancée, Jade’s cousin can’t marry the man 
she loves because they had the same wet nurse, just to name a few examples. Most 
strikingly, however, are the Orientalist stereotypes that resonate through every aspect of 
the series. Jade’s uncle is the stereotypical overbearing Arab man, who keeps Jade and her 
cousin imprisoned within his home and physically strikes them at the slightest provocation 
or rumor of impropriety. Men have multiple wives and dictate the terms of their own 
marriages, as well as those of their sisters and daughters. Women waver between the 
tropes of the sexualized and exotified belly dancer and the oppressed, veiled Muslim 
woman (tropes that they navigate as a part of Jade’s dual identity as both Latina and 
Arab). Every stereotype imaginable about the Maghreb is embodied within one of the 
subplots of the show--from camel rides, to scheming Arab merchants, to deveiling as a 
form of liberation.  
In other ways, the show fits in well with other Latin American dramas, relying on 
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contrived drama and extreme emotionality.149 The extreme Orientalism present in the text 
overshadows a barer truth about the content of the stark essentialization of of Muslimness 
and Latin Americanness as disparate objective identities with rigid boundaries. Jade is the 
most able to cross freely, as she inhabits both identities. However, even though she is 
identified as “ethnically Muslim” (read: Arab), she always fights for and tends to act 
towards her inclinations of latinidad--epitomized by her undying love for Lucas. Her 
cultural context is more important that her “ethnic” identity.150  
El Clon was one of the most watched television dramas in Latin America at the 
times of both its Portuguese and Spanish releases. Like other forms of media, the show 
was a way for the Latin American audiences to access a part of the world that most will 
never see in person. These forms of access to the Middle East act as a capitalist conduit of 
the commodity of cosmopolitanism. El Clon serves as a paragonic example of Latin 
American cosmopolitanism because the audience is able to navigate and transcend the 
Islamic East while also drawing connections to their own lives.  
In other words, coloniality promotes a one-way flow of information and 
knowledge-production as a continued legacy of colonialism. This information flow itself 
acts as a marker of civilizational indices. In this way, access to other places is a marker of 
development, both individually and societally. Study abroad programs often demonstrate 
this phenomenon as they add to the cultural capital of both the person studying abroad and 
the society from which they come. However, this accessibility is a commodity, something 
                                                
149 Twins that switch to fool their lovers? Check. Scheming for family fortune? Check. Unrequited love 
turned violent? Check.  
150 Interestingly enough, Sandra Echeverria who plays the main character, Jade, who is Moroccan stars in a 
romantic film called “Cambio de Ruta” in which she plays an indigenous woman who leads tours in 
southern México. Echeverria’s ability to “pass” as several “others” further exposes the ways in which 
Mexican cinema imagines race and ethnicity.  
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that not everyone has the ability to obtain. Watching El Clon or a Turkish drama, or 
wearing “harem style” jewelry allows Latin Americans to tap into this commodity and 
construct themselves more favorably in the civilizational rankings.  
It is not the converts who necessarily desire this cosmopolitan foreignness. It 
appears that it is the people who access Islam through non-religious methods, as described 
before (like the dramas) are more aptly described by this statement. They are subjects of 
coloniality, and thus seek the benefits that cosmopolitan credentials incur. Throwing a 
Middle Eastern themed party or belly-dancing like Shakira allows them to participate in an 
appropriative project of Orientalization.  
 This is not to detract from the agency of watching, producing, and engaging with 
cultural products. Part of Appiah’s argument is that people will react to cultural imports--
he cites TV shows like “Dallas” --in ways that affirm or contribute to their own sense of 
identity. Consumption or creation of certain products do not make watchers “passive 
vessels.”151 To assume that a person, when exposed to a television show (or even multiple 
television shows) must fall under some intractable spell and adopt the beliefs that are 
encoded within. It seems laughable that this is even possible. Rather, I am arguing that 
cosmopolitanism is not the only way through which agency is expressed for subaltern 
subjects. Appiah argues against cultural-imperialist visions in which cultural products 
from the center (usually the West) homogenize and destroy the cultures of the periphery. 
Appiah is correct to argue that individuals are able to decide for themselves what their 
own authenticity looks like.  
 Additionally, I’m not arguing that converts to Islam in México are not 
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cosmopolites. Very few converts at least visibly seem to express what Appiah calls neo-
fundamentalist views, ones that would clash with cosmopolitanism. Nor do I take issue 
with the majority of the argument that Pastor de Maria y Campos makes. Rather, her 
emphasis on resistance very much aligns with my own arguments about the agency of 
converts. Her ethnographic research especially demonstrates her assumption that subaltern 
subjects have agency (and she could hardly argue that converts are able to fight the 
oppressions she addresses if she didn’t believe that the converts possessed some form of 
agency). Rather, I’m seeking to show why assumptions about the desires of subaltern 
subjects are problematic.  
 We must also question the way in which cosmopolitanism operates in ways that 
reinforce oppression. People are shamed for not traveling abroad, for not being familiar 
with “ethnic” foods, and generally for not displaying cosmopolitanism. This intersects 
with classism and racism. Think too of the ways in which globalization has enforced the 
idea that one’s own culture is not “good enough” --that one must watch “Star Wars” and 
eat Chinese food and listen to the most recent Pitbull/Enrique Iglesias collaboration in 
order to be worthwhile global citizens. That is not to deride anyone who does any of those 
things, or claim that they are erasing or destroying in acts of cultural imperialism. Rather, 
it is the combination of power and cosmopolitan ethics that I wish to critique.  
 Lost in a discussion around cosmopolitanism are the many ways in which converts 
continue to affirm their identities. The Tzotzil Mayan converts conduct services in Tzotzil 
and gather for meals that reflect their own tastes. They often break the Ramadan fast with 
a communal meal of tacos. Women will wear traditional Mayan dresses along with the 
veil. The CCIM runs a da’wa focused around surfing, and the leader, Omar Weston, wears 
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shorts that conform with modesty dictates while on his board.152 Converts don’t shy from 
wearing “Peña Nieto” hats or commenting on government policies.153 Converting to Islam 
can affirm these identities and does not necessarily cause difference. The converts are not 
sacrificing their Mexicanness and/or their indigeneity for Islam (or possibly Arabness).  
 This section, more so than the others, demonstrates the universality of agency in 
México. Whatever is desired and pursued is agential; whether someone desires to be 
cosmopolitan and seeks that out in cultural productions or if someone desires God, each of 
these is a form of agency. Neither demonstrate someone merely reacting to outside forces, 
a passive object defined by others, but as someone working to make themselves in a form 
that they want to be. I’m digging at the terminology and ways in which words have 
meaning, especially ones that we use to describe others.  
 I also want to ensure that it is clear that I’m not trying to say that people are 
responsible for their own oppression. My argument is not that we ought to put the 
responsibility on people to revolt against power à la mode of the EZLN. I am not saying 
that because everyone has agency, or that it is their fault that oppressions remain because 
they have not fought them. 
 
The burden of proof in articulations of the subaltern  
Academics in some ways impose their own psychoses on the subaltern. We 
question their agency when it is we who are trapped, wondering if what we think is 
important, always questioning whether our work somehow makes our communities 
stronger or contributes in some way to the world. Our concerns about our own lack of 
                                                
152 Omar Weston, “Muslim Surfing Society,” Dawa in Mexico. Weston previous to conversion was a 
professional surfer, and continues to lead surfing lessons to outreach to young Muslims. 
153 “Mexican Muslims,” produced by Luis Chaparro, Vice, 2014.  
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agency are reflected upon those whom we write about. It is this effect that also allows us 
to write our own desires upon them, and does not force us to question the frameworks of 
knowledge production under which we operate. To liberate the subaltern subject from the 
burden of proving agency also liberates us: our work is a clear expression of agency as 
well. We need not worry that work, as menial or unimportant as it may seem, does not 
some matter. This is not to take the focus off of the subaltern subject, but to remark on 
some of the other benefits of shifting framework of analysis.  
 Researching literature on conversion to Islam in México (rather than 
ethnographically) seems like a project that be labeled as overly epistemological and as 
unnecessary. The population is small, there is not an overwhelming amount of literature, 
and I am not making new discoveries in the field. Yet I am convinced that the ways in 
which the conversion narratives and communities have diverse connections and 
experiences with both oppression and liberation justify the existence of such work.  
 Early on in my research I considered working on conversion to Islam in Latin 
America. Both Belize and Panama have incredibly active affiliates of the Nation of Islam. 
In Panama, a slave named Bayano led a rebellion and created a Muslim community during 
the mid-1500s, although he was eventually captured by Spanish authorities. However, this 
story of the historical connections of Islam and Panama have aided conversion efforts.154 
Conversion in South America has been concentrated in Afro-Brazilian communities, 
Bolivian and Chilean indigenous groups, and people in some way connected to the large 
numbers of Arab-speaking immigrants to the region.155 The former president of Argentina, 
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Carlos Menem, was a Syrian-Argentinian Muslim who converted to Roman Catholicism 
(although he would later marry a Syrian woman in a Muslim ceremony, causing some to 
doubt his affiliation to Catholicism--especially because his wife refused to say that he was 
Christian).156 During his presidency, there were two terror attacks on Jewish targets--the 
1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy  and the 1994 bombing of the Association Mutual 
Israelita-Argentina. Both attacks were said to be related to Hezbollah and Iran, although a 
number of cover-ups and corruption scandals have obfuscated the connection.157 
Argentina has the largest Muslim population and the largest Jewish population in South 
America, and these incidences reveal some of the complex ways in which politics, 
religion, and power align around Muslims in Latin America. In Brazil, like in the United 
States, conversion has been primarily driven by people of African descent, with many of 
the same antagonisms between immigrant and converted Muslims.158 There is a bit of 
scholarship on the active Muslim Puerto Rican hip-hop and rap scene.  
 There is some overlap and some major differences between these convert 
communities and those in México. It would be both interesting and informative to see 
whether proximity to the United States has any effect on conversions. Although México 
was the focus of this paper, the US plays a strong supporting role since it enforces the 
coloniality of power in other Latin American countries, but none of them (with the 
exception of Puerto Rico, whose relationship with the US looks very different) share a 
border with the US. There is also internal recognition of the ways in which both Muslims 
and Mexicans play an “other” in the imagination of US identity. Sometimes this 
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157 Gallo, “Muslims in South America,” 174. 
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recognition is cheeky—like news articles that instruct “How to tell a Mexican from a 
Muslim: A guide for the panicky American”—poking fun at Americans who can’t tell the 
difference between thick-moustache stereotypes.159  However, sometimes this is 
recognition is more insidious—take for instance the infamous Samuel Huntington, who 
has written controversial pieces on the threats that Mexicans and Muslims play to 
“Western civilizations.” Think-tanks write about the threat that Mexican converts pose to 
the US because of the possibility of al-Qaeda recruiting the converts to cross over to the 
US.160  
 Even within México, one could do touch on so many more important communities 
and so many more practices than I was able to mention. While the Centro Cultural 
Islamico de México (CCIM) was spoken about tangentially in relationship with other 
communities, the CCIM has led many da’wa efforts in and around México City I talked 
about the Sufi da’wa led by Omar Weston, the founder of the CCIM, but they have 
extended their community through more traditional da’wa efforts as well. Even within the 
communities I did write about, there is so much that is left to be discussed. One could 
compose an entire piece on the myriad of right-wing conspiracy websites about the 
converts in Chiapas (almost all of whom claim that it is an ISIS terrorist training ground in 
preparation for a holy war against the United States). Someone could do an analysis of the 
videos posted on Facebook of converts saying the shahadah, discussing where the 
converts are sitting, what information is provided about their lives outside the Muslim 
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community.  
 I wanted to point firstly to the reaction I often got from people (some of them in 
academia) when describing what I was researching and writing about. The overwhelming 
response was one of confusion and they would proceed to say something along the lines of 
“I suppose then that’s actually happening, then.” Not everyone reacted that way, but the 
general trend was of incredulity. I very much wanted to ensure that this project was not the 
commodification of the strange--so often in academia, that which is deemed as out of the 
ordinary is treated as the most important to study. This project was not to point out that 
conversion to Islam is happening in México, but to break away from thinking conversion 
is strange at all.  
Desconocido is a Spanish word that can mean either unknown or unfamiliar, a 
stranger, ignorance, hiddenness. The word is derived from conocer, to know, des, which 
serves as not, and -ido, the suffix which expresses that something was acted upon or made 
by.161 Desconocido can be used as the word of that or whom is unknown but also for the 
person who does not know, the person who does not recognize the unfamiliar, that is 
ignorant of the unknown. This word pokes holes at the assumptions that are made about 
strangeness and otherness. Desconocido is both for the converts and for us. The converts 
are not strange because they are inherently so, because it’s strange to have surfing da’wa 
or even to have Muslims reside in México. Rather, the converts are unfamiliar because we, 
the desconocidos, fail to recognize their existence. 
I am not arguing that we ought to know every detail about every religious minority 
around the world because that would be completely impossible. However, I’m trying to 
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press at our relationship as academics to the subjects we are writing about, of how all of 
the desconocidos are linked. I’ve mentioned our potential paranoia, and how that reflects 
in our writings about subaltern subjects. We should try to shift away from projecting our 
own insecurities, as well as other problems related to our positions of power and biases in 
Western lineages of thought.  
We ought to approach the subaltern as students with them as our teachers. It is we 
who are ignorant about them (and what we do know is often to perpetuate coloniality 
because it is based in frames of knowledge production that do so purposefully). Rather 
than treating them as sufferers under forms of oppression, we should treat subaltern 
subjects as experts in their methods of subverting oppression. Our work should focus on 
them, their cosmovisions, and their forms of knowledge.  
I do not have a precise answer for where agency begins and ends. However, we as 
academics should question the ways in which we produce knowledge where agency looks 
like the agency of the colonizer. The actions of the subaltern are assumed to be passive 
ones, mere responses to the coloniality of power. Because more power structures dominate 
them, there is the assumption that they are more subject to power. Because they are 
oppressed, it is assumed that they must be given a voice, and that the voice will be a 
unified, homogeneous, and anti-imperialist one. When their desires are interpreted, the 
articulations of those desires are supposed to be of a Marxist materialist flavor.  
 To take a longer view of history, we can see how the colonized do not need to be 
given a voice, nor our Western intellectual history of economic liberation. Certainly, 
Marxist or otherwise postcolonial terms and categorizations can be helpful to both 
communities and individuals in expressing their desires--but only because the 
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communities chose to embrace these visions and terminologies. It is people’s 
identification with tools like Marxism that makes the ideas so widely spread. The actions 
of the subaltern are assumed to be passive ones, mere responses to the coloniality of 
power. Because more power structures dominate them, there is the assumption that they 
are more subject to power. Because they are oppressed, it is assumed that they must be 
given a voice, and that the voice will be a unified, homogeneous, and anti-imperialist one. 
When their desires are interpreted, the articulations of those desires are supposed to be of 
a Marxist materialist flavor. We can see the failure of these modes of thinking when the 
actions and affirmations of the subaltern subjects themselves are not believed authentic. 
Their ability to create communities and seek what they desire in ways that subvert colonial 
ways of thinking demonstrate that even in submission there is agency. The converts 
submitting to new forms of authority is not defeat, but expressions of realignment, of 
questioning the borders and hierarchies of global-structures that are imposed upon them.  
 I spoke about the way that colonialism forced people to reimagine themselves. 
Shifting the definitions of agency to fit that of the subaltern demonstrates how subaltern 
subjects are reimagining their own subjectivities that undo the epistemologies of 
colonialism. The converts to Islam in México are subverting Western knowledges about 
converts, about Muslims, and about Mexicans, with all the complications that entails.  
  At the beginning, I quoted Mignolo “that the very concept of coloniality of power 
is already a decolonial move that, subsequently opens up the gates for imagining possible 
futures rather than just resting on the celebratory moment of critical explanation of what 
the social world is really like.”162 Mignolo addresses some of the many problems that 
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assuming agency leads us to. What use is the word agency if it is applied to everyone? If 
the academic is to assume that the entirety of the Mexican population has agency, why 
even use the word? First, I want to point to the fact that it is not that I am claiming that 
every single subject to the subaltern has agency. Rather, I want to shift the framework 
with which we ask the question of agency. Rather than assuming that every subject does 
not have agency, we should begin thinking about every subject as if they do. Too often in 
discussions and in writing, people will claim that the thoughts and feelings of the 
subaltern are not enough. I recall distinctly people criticizing that works written by 
women authors in British colonies in the late 19th century as not feminist enough, or that 
entirety of the arguments made by medieval philosophers are irrational because of their 
logical basis in Christianity. However, choosing to see these people as agents who are 
doing what they can to fight against sexism or to propagate knowledge challenges such 
narratives. Perhaps Descartes acknowledgements of God are not submission to the 
Roman Catholic church, but a subversion of it, a way to spread knowledge and survive in 
spite of the church. Likewise, why do we assume that the women authors are unable to 
imagine a radical feminist world that converges to our standards? I believe that they were 
and are capable of producing utopias that look like ours, and they choose not to. They are 
expressing their utopia, their feelings, and not our own.  
 Finally, we are not at a point where agency is applied to everyone. Mignolo points 
to “imagining possible futures” and redefining agency is simply one way in which we can 
collectively push together against the epistemological powers of coloniality. The 
Mexican who converts to Islam is making a choice (in some senses of the word): a choice 
that she makes for something that she wants. Why must she prove her agency to us?  
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